Strictly investigate a series of regulatory corruption cases of the former Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau
Get rid of the ghosts in supervision and protect financial security
On May 21, the Party Committee of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission and the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Group of the National Supervision Commission of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission issued the "Notice on Carrying out System-wide Warning Education on a Series of Supervisory Corruption Cases Behind the Serious Credit Risk Events of Baoshang Bank" to urge the system Party organizations at all levels and all party members and cadres have learned from the case.
On May 12, the bribery case of Xue Jining, former party secretary and director of the Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau, was heard in the court.
When Xue Jining fell behind the French Open, it was a “crypt case” involving five cadres of the former Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau’s leadership team in corruption supervision.
Since November 2019, with the approval of the State Supervision Commission of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Team of the State Supervision Commission of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, together with the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, has investigated and dealt with a series of regulatory corruption cases of the former Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Commission.
The squad leader leads the team and the team leads the team to collapse, which is an important feature of the corruption case of the former Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau.
Before Xue Jining's trial, Liu Jinming, former party committee member of the Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau, Song Jianji, former party secretary and deputy director of the Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau, Chen Zhitao, former party committee member and deputy director of the Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau, and Jia Qizhen, former party committee member of the Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau The others stood in the dock one after another.
Their main violations of discipline and law all occurred during Xue Jining's tenure as party secretary and director.
Why did regulators become corrupters?
How can the discipline inspection and supervision organs accurately dismantle bombs and eradicate the "inside ghosts" of financial supervision?
The reporter conducted an interview and investigation.
1 The leadership team fell collectively, and the bureau’s system supervision cadres were involved in the case to varying degrees
In May 2019, the former "star" bank Baoshang Bank was jointly taken over by the People's Bank of China and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission due to serious credit risks.
In August 2020, Baoshang Bank filed an application for bankruptcy due to serious insolvency; in November 2020, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission "in principle agreed that Baoshang Bank entered bankruptcy proceedings."
Baoshang Bank was established on the basis of 17 urban credit cooperatives including Baotou Science and Technology City Credit Cooperative. It was established in December 1998 with the approval of the People's Bank of China. It is the first joint-stock commercial bank established in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
The fundamental reason for the "fall" of Baoshang Bank is the continued "empty" of illegal financial groups, but regulatory corruption is also an important driving factor.
Not only must we get rid of the financial "masters", we must also protect the country's "jade plate" of financial assets.
In order to achieve precise bomb disposal, under the strong guidance of the Third Supervision and Inspection Office of the State Supervision and Inspection Commission of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ninth Supervision and Inspection Office, the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Team in the meeting has made it clear that confidentiality should be strengthened in the preliminary review of related issues, and the situation should be investigated from the outside. .
Taking the opportunity of Yang Alin, the principle chairman of the rural credit cooperatives in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, accepted the review and investigation, the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Team of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region interrogated more than 10 senior executives in Inner Mongolia’s financial system in Hohhot and Ulan Chabu. The problem of Liu Jinming and Jia Qizhen receiving large amounts of property.
On November 16, 2019, a lien decision was placed in front of Liu Jinming.
Liu Jinming was once the director of Baotou Banking Regulatory Bureau. It was during his work in Baotou that Baoshang Bank achieved initial expansion.
As a result, the "lid" behind the serious credit risk of Baoshang Bank in a series of regulatory corruption cases was gradually lifted.
More than a month later, Jia Qizhen was detained.
When investigating the case of Liu Jinming and Jia Qizhen, the task force further locked down the persons involved, and on June 4, 2020, the case was filed against Xue Jining, Song Jianji, and Chen Zhitao at the same time and lien measures were taken.
So far, a series of regulatory corruption cases have been fully uncovered.
After investigation, under the premeditated and hierarchical draw and corrosion of illegal financial groups and Baoshang Bank, Xue Jining and others ignored party discipline and national laws, and were selfish and greedy. They were willing to be "hunted" and actively sought "hunting" without fear of accepting them. , Asking for equity, real estate, cash and various valuables, a total of more than 700 million yuan.
Among them, more than 80% of the property received from Baoshang Bank.
The amount of corruption is huge, with an average of over 10 million yuan per person, of which Xue Jining received over 400 million yuan in bribes.
“The problem of regulatory corruption exposed by the case is shocking.” The comrades of the task force analyzed that first, the "collapse method" corruption area was large. Under the bad influence of the "critical minority", the former Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau lost all key parts and key links. Cadres "take everything big and small" for institution establishment, access approval, loan business, engineering construction, personnel arrangements, etc., where the supervisory power covers, corruption will breed and spread; second, there are a wide range of sources of corruption, and all kinds of bribery are given as gifts. The target is not rejected. In addition to Baoshang Bank, there are also executives of other banking financial institutions, illegal business owners, relatives and friends and subordinates of colleagues, etc.; the third is corruption regardless of the scene, from the festival to the acceptance of personnel Please entrust, and then to provide supervision asylum, various supervision powers are waiting to be sold; the fourth is the "family mobilization" of corruption, and the big use of husband and wife files, father and son soldiers, and brothers.
"This series of regulatory corruption cases is a'nesting case' led by the'key few', the collective fall of the team, and the overall failure of responsibilities. It is a concentrated manifestation of the deep interweaving of financial corruption and financial risks. It is a non-convergent case after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. , And even after the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the typical corruption of ignorance against the wind and violation of discipline is serious in nature, bad in impact, and painful lessons.” said the relevant staff of the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Group of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission.
2 Supervising cadres and the target of supervision, the "cat and mouse family", acted as "pawns" of the illegal group due to the deep connection of interest binding
The staff of the task force told reporters that the original Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau’s series of regulatory corruption cases are outstanding examples of organized and premeditated “hunting” supervision by illegal interest groups. Baoshang Bank hierarchically “hunting” supervision cadres, and there are many types of interest transmission carriers. The "encirclement hunting" method is frequent, and the plot is extremely bad.
In October 2009, Liu Jinming was transferred from Chifeng Banking Regulatory Bureau to Baotou Banking Regulatory Bureau.
As soon as he learned that he was going to the head of Baotou, Baoshang Bank sent someone a 100,000 yuan meeting gift to release a "friendly" signal.
After Liu Jinming took office, Li Zhenxi, then chairman of Baoshang Bank, said to him on multiple occasions: "Leader, we follow you, you support us, we rush in front, and we will play together when we are old." This means that if the two parties form a community of interests, if the Baoshang Bank is done well, Liu Jinming will also be rewarded.
In order to build a good relationship with Liu Jinming, Baoshang Bank arranged personnel to woo Corruption in all directions.
"When I went to work in Baotou and wanted to rent a house, Baoshang Bank bought a house and gave it to me. My family is in Beijing, and I want to go to Beijing after retirement. Baoshang Bank bought me a house in Beijing. Let me choose a more expensive suite. Baoshang Bank took the initiative to help me out for everything, making me feel like a family, regardless of each other, completely forgetting the relationship between supervision and being supervised." Liu Jinming confessed.
Similarly, as soon as Xue Jining arrived as the party secretary and director of the Inner Mongolia Bureau, Li Zhenxi surrounded him, tried his best to win him, and "humbly" asked him about economics.
Xue Jining introduced his wife to Li Zhenxi. Li Zhenxi was responsive to Xue Jining's wife and tried his best to establish a close relationship with her. She was willing to be her little follower and successfully embarked on the "madam route."
"When I return to Beijing during the Spring Festival, my home is always full of things sent by Li Zhenxi. I didn't oppose, stop or correct them, and even deceived myself that these have nothing to do with me, and let them communicate to the point where my sister and brother are commensurate. "Xue Jining wrote in the confession, "They used equity and money as bait and my wife as a hook to catch my greedy big fish, and they tied me and Baoshang Bank tightly. "
"The former leadership of the Banking Regulatory Bureau of Inner Mongolia was deeply corroded by Baoshang Bank and other companies, deviating from the original intention of supervision, abandoning supervisory duties, and neglecting supervision in all aspects." The staff of the task force told reporters that the first is to avoid real access supervision. In fact, the illegal financial group's control of Baoshang Bank is well known in the local financial system, but the Inner Mongolia Bureau and Baotou Branch do not conduct substantive examinations in the access link, so that the problems that should have been exposed have never been fully exposed.
The second is that on-site inspections are never punished. From 2009 to 2016, the Inner Mongolia Bureau and Baotou Branch carried out more than 50 on-site inspections on Baoshang Bank, always deliberately avoiding businesses with huge risks, and never imposed administrative penalties on problems discovered. Xue Jining, Jia Qizhen even instructed to delete the major violations found in the on-site inspection.
The third is to deliberately raise the regulatory rating. Baoshang Bank's regulatory rating is seriously inconsistent with the bank's actual risk level, providing a false regulatory "endorsement" for the bank's implementing agencies and business expansion.
The fourth is that the petition and report verification was perfunctory. During Xue Jining's tenure as director, he received many petition reports that reflected the manipulation of illegal financial groups and "dumped" Baoshang Bank, but he never seriously organized verification.
The former team of the Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau, a group of collective corruption, and the "cat and mouse family", the target of supervision, acted as the "pawns" of the lawless group because of the deep association of interests.
During Xue Jining's tenure as director, he set up branches in Shenzhen, Chengdu, Beijing and other areas for Baoshang Bank, rushing around, ignoring the problems caused by the bank's management capabilities and blindly rapid expansion.
Song Jianji and Li Zhenxi are like brothers, and at his request, they went to the banking regulatory bureaus of other places to intercede and protect the shortcomings of the prospective executives whose access was restricted.
When Liu Jinming was the director of Baotou branch, he participated in the location selection of Baoshang Bank branch, attended the opening ceremony and cut the ribbon to cheer, and became the spokesperson of the regulated institution.
3 The root cause of collective corruption, abuse of power and loss of supervision at various levels is that the party’s leadership of financial supervision has been dissimilated into a key minority’s self-serving prestige.
Xue Jining wrote in the confession: "I took the lead in not talking about politics, taking the lead in violating party discipline, and failing to do a good job in the ideological and political construction of the team and the construction of party style and clean government. This severely damaged the political ecology of the Banking Regulatory Bureau of Inner Mongolia and caused the party committee. The team members are corrupt in their ways."
As the “top leader” of the party and government leadership, Xue Jining has long ignored the party’s political discipline and rules, which has led to the continued deterioration of the political ecology of the Banking Regulatory Bureau of Inner Mongolia and extremely abnormal intra-party relations.
During his 7 and a half years in office, Xue Jining disregarded the "three important and one large" rules of procedure, and never studied and deployed the supervision of Baoshang Bank at a party committee meeting. Democratic centralism was in vain, and the phenomenon of "one speech" was common.
The members of the team have never "red-faced and sweated", and democratic life would "walk through the scene", and criticism and self-criticism would be reduced to mutual flattery.
Some people reported that Song Jianji had close contacts with rural financial institutions, and Xue Jining left the village and township banks to Song Jianji without reminding him.
There were conflicts among the team members. Xue Jining asked Li Moumou, the chairman of a chemical company in Inner Mongolia, to come forward to suppress him. This "social man" was called his "underground organization minister."
Xue Jining engaged in the trade of power and money when selecting and appointing cadres, and sold the officials arbitrarily, so that some cadres were "promoted with illness" and laid the groundwork for "collapse of corruption."
Xue Jining said in the confession: "I promoted Jia Qizhen and received him 100,000 yuan and 10,000 euros; I promoted Liu Jinming and received him 180,000 yuan three times..."
What's more, Xue Jining interfered with the investigation of the case by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bureau, demanding that major issues be turned into small matters.
Xue Jining received a report from the Inner Mongolia Bureau that reflected "Baoshang Bank President Li Zhenxi bribed the leaders of Baotou Banking Regulatory Branch", and approved the transfer to Baotou Banking Regulatory Branch in violation of regulations; for the report transferred by the CBRC Disciplinary Committee, he arbitrarily selected clues about the problem and narrowed it down. Scope of verification.
During Liu Jinming's tenure as secretary of the Disciplinary Committee, he served as a "tool" for Xue Jining to calm people down.
From 2011 to 2015, the Disciplinary Committee of the former Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau has been "zero case registration", and the supervision and discipline enforcement has been severely loose and soft.
Other members of the team are up and down.
Jia Qizhen has been in charge of the city commercial bank for 10 years. From 2005 to the incident, he accepted the request to intervene in the personnel work of the regulated institution and the Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau, a total of 74 people, in personnel recruitment, job adjustment, job promotion, salary and benefits, etc. For the benefit of others, 53 of them received a total of more than 7 million yuan in donations.
His wife and brother were "double-opened" by the original unit and sentenced to probation by the court. They were still assigned to a state-owned enterprise as the director of risk, which caused a bad impact.
Jia Qizhen also used his supervisory authority to greet a number of banks, contract renovation projects for outlets and IT projects of a number of banks, and accept bribes from illegal businessmen.
Phenomena such as non-compliance with rules, laissez-faire responsibility, and breaking through the trampling system exist in the bureau.
For example, the original China Banking Regulatory Commission stipulated that “in principle, only one village and township bank shall be established within a single county (city) and other administrative divisions.” Xue Jining and others used illegal naming and other methods to deliberately circumvent the situation in 7 counties (districts, districts, districts, etc.) including Saihan District, Hohhot City. Qi) all approved the establishment of 2 or more village and township banks.
The relevant person in charge of the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Group in the conference said that the root cause of Xue Jining and others' collective corruption and abuse of power and the failure of supervisory levels is that the bureau has strictly governed the party and is loose and soft, and the party's leadership of supervision has been alienated into a "key minority" personal will Above the organization, the "two responsibilities" are not implemented, especially the lack of effective supervision of the "top leader", which leads to the deterioration of the political ecology and the complete failure of performing duties.
4 Summarize lessons profoundly, truly implement rectification and reform, and strengthen party governance
The governance of corruption in the financial sector is highly political, policy-sensitive, and sensitive. It must be firmer and more stable, more precise and effective, and more careful about methods and methods. The key to rectification and governance is to "control people, keep money, and build a strong institutional firewall." ", to promote investigations, recover losses, plug loopholes, prevent risks, and shape culture together.
In reviewing the original Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau’s series of regulatory corruption cases, the fundamental reason is that the bureau’s party leadership has been seriously weakened and the main responsibility of governing the party has fallen seriously.
After the incident, the party committee of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission quickly adjusted and enriched the leadership of the Inner Mongolia Banking and Insurance Regulatory Bureau, and strengthened its leadership in a special period. Most of the current bureau members are selected from outside.
In the "Working Thoughts and Recommendations on the Series of Corruption Cases Behind the Serious Credit Risks of Baoshang Bank" submitted to the Party Committee of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the Discipline Inspection and Supervision Team in the Commission recommended "strengthening the party building of dispatched institutions" and "standardize the decision-making mechanism of dispatched institutions' party committees, and improve The'Three Majors and One Large' list, centered on the decision and deployment of the Party Central Committee, clearly included the implementation of key work arrangements for the higher-level party committees, the establishment of important institutions and equity changes, the major risk mitigation and disposal of small and medium-sized banks, and major administrative penalties, etc., and reported them to the higher-level party committees for the record; perfect The rules for the record of party committee meetings, strengthen the documentary records of the whole process of meetings involving "three important and one big" matters, to ensure that the process can be traced."
The Banking and Insurance Regulatory Bureau of Inner Mongolia strictly implements democratic centralism, party committee rules of procedure, and "three important and one large" collective research and decision-making systems, and major risk handling and major regulatory issues are included in the party committee's decision-making scope.
Xue Jining and others deviated from the "supervisory surname" positioning, relying on supervision and supervision, which brought great risks to financial security, and the lessons were extremely painful.
In order to strengthen the restriction and supervision on the operation of supervisory power, the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Team in the meeting suggested that the Party Committee of the Banking and Insurance Regulatory Bureau of Inner Mongolia should comprehensively promote the investigation and prevention of anti-corruption risks and clarify the duties and responsibilities of various links in response to outstanding risks of integrity and loss of control of regulatory power. The boundary of power cuts off the corruption chain of benefit transmission.
Standardize the operation of supervisory powers, regularly conduct spot checks on important administrative license application and approval materials, off-site supervision and discovery of risk agency rectification, on-site inspection project work papers, and supervisory rating work papers, and take timely measures when problems are found, and strictly monitor the accountability atmosphere.
Fully regulate the personal investment and financing behavior of supervisory cadres, carry out special clean-ups on illegal shares in rural commercial banks, village banks and other issues, and investigate the situation of supervisory cadres themselves, their close relatives, and collateral relatives within three generations of illegal investment in financial institutions.
In order to reduce the risk of regulatory power being "hunted", the Inner Mongolia Banking and Insurance Regulatory Bureau established five committees for administrative licensing, off-site supervision, on-site inspection, administrative punishment, and administrative reconsideration to cooperate and restrict each other.
Xue Jining and others abused power and were willing to be "encircled and hunted". The root cause was the loss of ideals and beliefs, and the party spirit and principles disappeared.
On January 22, after announcing the decision to expel Xue Jining, Song Jianji, and Chen Zhitao from the party, cancel their enjoyment of benefits, and collect the proceeds of violation of discipline, the Party Committee of the Inner Mongolia Banking and Insurance Regulatory Bureau immediately convened the 2020 democratic life meeting for party members and leading cadres and the case-specific democratic life meeting. , 124 problems were investigated, 40 problems were analyzed, and 103 rectification measures were proposed.
On January 25, the bureau organized a warning education conference.
Since May this year, the Party Committee of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission and the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Team of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission have organized system-wide special warning education, comprehensive self-inspection and self-correction, and established a sound long-term mechanism to promote the formation of "the failure of timely detection of risks is dereliction of duty, and failure to timely discover risks. Prompt and disposal is a serious regulatory atmosphere of dereliction of duty, and maintain the stability of the financial market and the national financial security.
(Our reporter Han Yadong and Wu Jing)