Recently, a special topic of my journalistic interest has been the strengthening of China's ambitions in the Middle East and the prospects for the Iranian-Chinese-Russian cooperation triangle.
Only the lazy has not written about this geopolitical triangle, or the new "Asian" axis, in recent years.
The very idea of a new powerful strategic alliance opposing the United States, a new counterbalance to the Atlantic alliance excites many minds - in Iran, China and Russia.
Here are just a few quotes from the authors I read.
Arian Tabatabai, daughter of the renowned philosopher and scientist of the Islamic Republic of Iran Javad Tabatabai, who was appointed advisor to the Biden administration in February 2021, published the book Triple Axis: Iranian Relations with Russia and China in 2018.
Here is its summary: “The most serious challenge to the international order after the Cold War is the growing power of ambitious states confronting the West.
Iran, Russia and China view the global structure through the prism of historical experience.
Rejecting the universality of Western liberal values, these states and their governments view the relative decline of Western economic hegemony as an opportunity. ”
That sounds good.
It's tempting, agree.
Or already the French, the work "China, Iran, Russia: a new Mongol empire?"
“On March 20, 2013, the Institute for Homeland Security Policy named Russian, Chinese and Iranian hackers guilty of attacks destabilizing US security systems.
Not content with the rise of cyber intrusions, China, Russia and Iran are now increasingly cooperating in the field of new technologies.
Are these three countries in the process of establishing a new Mongol empire, or are they desperately trying to maintain their regional influence?
Contrary to the political construction of Genghis Khan, which united Eurasia from the Turkish-Mongolian center, these allies surround the territory of the Turkish civilization, from which they turned away ... ) stereotypes ...
Also on russian.rt.com Media: Russia, China and Iran create a new global paradigm
The crystallization of such an alliance is the fear of the United States, whose game is to separate these states.
In 2001, China and Russia established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, one of whose main tasks is to counter American influence in Central Asia.
Tajikistan is one of its founders.
In 2005, Iran joined it, in 2012 - Afghanistan.
(Actually - no, Afghanistan and Iran joined the SCO as observers, but the headquarters of the organization, located in Beijing, has not yet made them full members, and this is an important nuance. -
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) This means that the entire the Persian-speaking world is now part of the alliance.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization unites 1.5 billion inhabitants on an area of 26 million square meters.
km, possesses 50% of the world's uranium reserves and 40% of coal.
It was within this framework that joint military maneuvers were carried out, as well as exchanges in the field of medicine and nanotechnology. "
This essay was written in 2013 by the Mondes Futurs laboratory.
It was written by Thomas Fleisch, famous in the academic and military-political elite of France, professor at the Institute for Political Studies in Bordeaux, the Naval School, the Saint-Cyr Special Military School;
Jean-Marie Holzinger, Sino-Russian Relations Specialist, Jerome Paris and Antoine-Louis de Premonville, Doctor of Literature and Civilizations.
Since then, the ghost of the "new Mongol empire" has been haunting the university and military-analytical think tanks of Eurasia with tempting prospects.
But despite the fact that it is already 2021, this axis has not yet formed into that very full-fledged "anti-American counterweight", although this geopolitical triangle has many fans both in Iran and in Russia.
And there, and there, many hawks dream of striking the hegemon, tired of the US monopoly and the rules of the world order formed by them.
As a counterargument - that it is China that will not build this triangle in earnest - I want to cite a link to Xue Won's sensational article in the American Foreign Policy "China will not save Iran", published on December 18, 2020.
Vaughn makes sense to listen to, as he is a somewhat unique case - an ethnic Chinese, an American citizen, and a former Iranian prisoner.
Historical scientist from Princeton University, after the conclusion of the nuclear deal with the United States, he went to Iran to live and work in the archives on his doctoral dissertation.
Many then, after the signing of the nuclear deal, thought that by opening the Iron Curtain, Tehran became friendly and open to travelers.
Personally, I was invited to Iran by Iranian Ambassador to Russia Reza Sajjadi, promising that good Iran would win my heart and that it is not at all as aggressive as the US and "Zionist propaganda" paint it.
US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook meets Xue Won in the US after his release in Iran
AFP
© US State Department
Vaughn in Iran quickly attracted the attention of Iranian counterintelligence, was arrested, accused of espionage and thrown into prison (in his articles, Vaughn repeatedly quotes his Iranian investigator, who directly explained to him that he was imprisoned in order to exchange the necessary Iranian prisoners for him. USA, that is, in fact, taken hostage).
Today, Vaughn is very skeptical about that very comprehensive agreement on a strategic partnership between China and Iran for 25 years (and Chinese investments of more than $ 400 billion).
And explains why.
“Although China has been Iran's largest trading partner since 2009, Iran itself has remained secondary to China.
Even in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the UAE outperform Iran when it comes to trade with China.
According to the Ministry of Commerce of China, in 2014, at its historical peak, Sino-Iranian trade amounted to 51.85 billion, or 1.2% of the total volume of China's foreign trade.
In the same year, the trade between China and Saudi Arabia was $ 69.15 billion, for example.
And the volume of Sino-US trade in the same year amounted to $ 555 billion, or 12.9% of China's foreign trade. "
(The data that Vaughn refers to is slightly different from the data of the United States Census Bureau. -
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“From a geopolitical point of view, ports such as Jask or Chabahar, as well as railway projects connecting Central Asia, would provide unique advantages to Iran, not China ... These geopolitical and economic realities dictate that Iran does not occupy an irreplaceable position in strategic calculations of China, but is one of the necessary relations maintained in the region. "
Won goes on to write about Xi Jinping's first historic visit to Iran in 2016, which is considered the starting point of new Iranian-Chinese relations and the beginning of that very 25-year agreement.
After Xi's visit to Iran, big Chinese business rushed to Iran, optimistically exploring new opportunities in mysterious Persia.
Vaughn was in Iran at about the same time and, as he writes, "had the opportunity to communicate with many Chinese businessmen representing large state-owned enterprises, and through his social circles personally observe the dynamics of trade between the two countries" (for this, the Iranians, apparently, his and arrested, smart and observant are loved in few places).
However, his testimonies are very valuable and instructive.
“Despite initial optimism, Chinese commercial interests met with a sluggish reception, and the preferential treatment China had hoped for fell short of expectations.
After the nuclear deal, many foreign companies began to enter the Iranian market, and the Iranian business community made increased demands on Chinese business.
Iranians have long favored everything western.
They also tended to discriminate against Chinese products and services, even if they were comparable in quality and lower in price than Western counterparts.
Even the Iranian state media subtly hinted at the inferiority of Chinese manufacturing and promoted different cultural and political biases against China.
Chinese businessmen complained that, to their disappointment, the Iranian partners wanted a large amount of investment, but a smaller share of Chinese products and technologies in joint projects. "
In short, Iranian business and politicians were waiting for suitcases of Chinese money, which could be well assimilated by building the facilities that Iran itself needs - roads, ports, oil and gas projects, and so on.
And China had its own plans - it certainly did not feel like a fairy from a fairy tale who would perform an Iranian miracle for thanks.
What follows is an instructive story - for both China and Russia - about how China, very eager to get South Pars, the world's largest gas field, did not receive it, since Iran did not hesitate to hand over the South Pars Phase 11 project to the French giant Total. " ...
The Chinese did not remain in debt: for Iranian oil, which they bought at a huge discount (China again began to buy it at a cheap price, when Trump returned sanctions on Iran in 2018 and Tehran was again in a very vulnerable position), they did not pay as much foreign exchange necessary for survival.
Buying up Iranian oil, China paid off Iranian debts to Chinese oil companies that were working in Iran.
Or he left money in his own Chinese bank "Kunlun" (China's Bank of Kunlun) - the only Chinese bank that carries out operations with Iran related to oil.
China carried out banking operations with Iranian money only for "humanitarian operations with food and medicine" (Beijing complied with the American sanctions - and, I want to add, it did not without pleasure).
Here, by the way, is the answer to the question of many who asked me why Iran still has such high statistics on covid.
Because.
Vaughn writes that the transfer of some of these funds through illegal channels costs the Iranian regime a fortune - 12% of the transaction amount.
This is useful to know for those who think that China will save us or someone else in the event of the onset of American sanctions.
In his article, Vaughn is convincing enough that China will never put its relations with the United States and its economic growth and financial gains on the line for the sake of any country.
Simple math: trade with the United States is more than ten times higher than trade with Iran.
Trump's trade war with China was triggered by precisely this "tricky" imbalance towards Beijing.
In that very 2014, since we are taking it for comparison, the United States supplied goods to China for $ 123 billion, and China in the United States - for $ 468 billion.
Let's look at more recent data: in 2020, the trade turnover between China and Iran amounted to only $ 14.91 billion!
And of course, China wins here too: $ 8.51 billion is the supply of Chinese goods to Iran, Iranian profit is only $ 6 billion and a little.
And the trade between the United States and China in 2020 is $ 586.72 billion, of which $ 451.81 billion is Chinese “profit” (TASS data).
Do I need to clarify which partner and which market is a priority for Beijing?
And he will not violate US sanctions for the sake of "friendship" with anyone (unless there is permission from Washington).
On the contrary, we can conclude that the raw material countries that have come under Western sanctions are Chinese gesheft.
Buy cheap oil without paying cash for it, or leave payment for it in your own bank, or supply Chinese "consumer goods" in exchange for valuable raw materials.
“When Hong Kong's pro-Beijing chief executive Kerry Lam was left without a bank account, her salary was paid in cash for fear of US sanctions, and this is in China's own Special Administrative Territory.
The question arises: to what extent can China really challenge US sanctions ... The overriding goal of China's foreign policy will be to restore its relationship with the United States, and any potential deal with Iran will only obey a broader imperative, ”Vaughn writes.
(Those interested in more details can read the original article.)
I have written columns on a possible China-Russia-Iran triangle more than once, and I still consider its existence possible (subject to a number of geopolitical factors).
But knowing alternative perspectives is always helpful.
At least we saw that from the internationally announced China-Russia-Iran naval exercises in the northern Indian Ocean, held in mid-February 2021, China pulled out at the last moment.
Iranian generals, who did not expect such a turn, publicly explained this by the fact that China is supposedly celebrating the Chinese New Year.
And we, of course, noticed that the Iranian delegation flew to Vienna to participate in negotiations on returning to the nuclear deal with the United States ten days after the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister to Tehran - and the publicly held position of the Chinese Foreign Ministry that Iran should return into an American deal.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.