Transit - it is also transit in Africa.
And equally in America.
It is impossible to immediately mobilize and deploy a foreign policy machine.
And even just hand it over to the new bosses.
All this takes some time.
But the US State Department (of course, in cooperation with the White House) worked in a Stakhanovian way.
On January 20, the Democratic administration took the reins, and on March 28, a little over two months later, the new Secretary of State Blinken reported that the foreign policy inventory in the most important - and most threatened - areas had been completed.
“The US authorities are completing a review of Russia's aggressive actions, for which Moscow will face consequences.
We see various examples of Russian aggression everywhere.
And the president made it clear that these actions will entail consequences.
We are completing a review of the cyberattack on us, interference in elections, the use of chemical weapons in an attempt to kill Alexei Navalny. "
In 1919, at Versailles, Premier Clemenceau, nicknamed the Tiger, said: "The Boches will pay for everything."
A century later, although it is far from the victorious peace conference (it is not visible at all), Blinken the Tiger expresses himself in a similar manner.
"Forward, and woe to Godunov."
However, American harshness awaits not only Moscow.
At the same time, Blinken warned his Chinese comrades: “In relations with China, more and more aspects are emerging that intensify confrontation, they are definitely of a competitive nature.
We must build our relationship with China from a position of strength. "
Generally speaking, all this could have been announced faster.
Bulk, Hong Kong, election interference, Xinjian etc.
- it was enough to tell the secretary to bring the necessary folders.
It will take half a day to write examples of Russian and Chinese malice from them.
After all, everything was already clear, and chemical weapons with Hong Kong were just an excuse.
Nor was it necessary to broadcast "Coming at you" on CNN.
Terrible words can also be conveyed through closed diplomatic channels, which is even more convenient in some respects.
If a foreign opponent decides to concede, it will be easier for him to save face.
In the case of the public "Rus (resp .:" han "), give up!"
it's harder to do this.
But another question is more interesting to the resolute Blinken.
The fact that Washington cannot count on either friendship with Moscow or friendship with Beijing, let alone friendship with both of them, is understandable.
There are too many serious contradictions, foreign policy does not engage in sentimentality (except perhaps in the form of hypocrisy) and evaluates not good intentions, but the capabilities of a partner.
Both Moscow and Beijing have them.
But usually they try to beat the rivals separately.
Concentrate forces and means in one direction, and in the other for the time being to maintain neutrality or even cooperation.
For it is always more convenient and effective to beat with a fist, and not with a splayed hand.
This was very well understood by Prince Bismarck, to whom the expression "coalition nightmare" (in the sense of anti-German) belonged.
In the twentieth century - in 1914 and in 1941 - Germany twice neglected these fears, and it did not go to her advantage.
The price for such neglect was Versailles for the first time, and 1945 for the second time.
And the "zero hour" of 1991 was to a large extent caused by the fact that by the beginning of the 1980s the USSR found itself in a conflict with the West, and with China, and with the Islamic world.
It didn't end well either.
But the smart ones learn from strangers - in the worst case, from their own - mistakes, while the unwise ones do not learn at all - neither from theirs, nor from others.
Trump's intermezzo - of course, chaotic and inconsistent, but at least at a declarative level recognizing that it is no longer possible to be stronger than all enemies at the same time - was declared a bad dream.
"Now with me everything will be like under Obamushka."
They drove out Trump, and with him - the imperial overstrain, from now on we will win on all fronts at once.
After all, this is what the Blinken doctrine boils down to.
And all the stratagems, from Romulus to the present day, edifyingly narrating that rivals must always be pitched against each other and certainly not pushed into mutual embraces - this is for some fools, not for us, because we are smarter than everyone else.
Unfortunately, self-confidence of the Blinken type - reason in spite of, in defiance of the elements - ends badly not only for the Blinkens (you can reluctantly accept this), but also for all world balances.
With which it is already more difficult to come to terms.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.