In general, this winter has done a lot for everyone to be able to sort out regional priorities in the energy sector.
Just as an example.
Here, as they say, the regions report.
Yes, not simple regions, but European ones - more precisely, the Russian "Gazprom" is forced to do it for them, simply because it is difficult for the regions here to say something more or less intelligible.
So, according to the data of the domestic gas giant, gas reserves in underground storage facilities in Germany have dropped to 26%, in Austria - up to 29%, in France - up to 18%, in the Netherlands - up to 24%.
In general, in Europe, gas reserves in UGS facilities have decreased by an average of 31%.
The numbers, it should be noted, are tangible.
It cannot be said that they are absolutely critical for the security of European energy, but already on the brink.
Moreover, with reference to the data of Gas Infrastructure Europe, the Russian gas giant also separately - not hiding a certain malice - noted that the volume of gas remaining in European underground storage by March 21 is currently at a very tangible 24.5 billion cubic meters.
m less than in the same UGS facilities, it was for the same period last year, 2020.
And this despite the fact that from January 1 to March 15, 2021, Gazprom increased the export of blue fuel to non-CIS countries by an average of 28.3% - to 42.9 billion cubic meters.
In particular, supplies to Germany, the base for Russian gas workers, were increased by 28.7%.
And all the same - the result, as they say, is obvious.
In numbers.
Accordingly, that is why it makes sense to admit (just as a fact, without arguing): this summer Europe will need a much larger additional volume of gas.
There is nothing special or unexpected here - just ordinary mathematics.
And this is not the question at all.
The question is where to get this additional volume.
And even at a normal price.
Here, after all, what is the problem: it is extremely naive to believe that such an increased demand for Russian (not only pipeline gas, by the way - and LNG was well sold) gas in Europe now exists only thanks to the cold winter.
This is just nonsense.
Yes, winter gave a very serious plus to demand, no one denies this.
Very serious, albeit for a very short period of time.
However, do not forget about the equally serious drop in traditional demand in Europe associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and constantly replacing lockdowns throughout the Old Continent.
So the "cold winter demand" is more likely to compensate for this drop.
The main reason for the growth in demand for Russian gas is much more systemic, and, by the way, we have written about it more than once.
More precisely, there are several reasons for this.
Here a lot, as they say, came together.
This is the continuing decline in European production itself (the textbook history of the Groningen field is even a little symbolic here, if you will).
And the gradual, but nevertheless quite decisive refusal of Germany and the territories close to it along the contour of the north-western industrial cluster from coal and nuclear generation.
Accordingly, the drop-out must be replaced with at least something, and, for example, the same green energy repeatedly announced by all possible and impossible lobbyists in this sense, as it turned out, looks completely helpless.
And to count on it systematically as the salvation of European energy markets - to raise doubts about our own competence.
At least among serious people.
And what then, one wonders, to replace the lost volumes, especially if Europe is still going to somehow get out of the grave economic crisis associated with the pandemic?
The many times promised American LNG did not appear in Europe even during the freezing period, when spot prices simply went off scale with attractiveness (Gazprom, by the way, also made a pretty good off-plan money on this).
And this means that American gas did not appear in Europe for one extremely simple reason: it is simply not physically available in the volumes required for replacement.
And what is, instantly goes to the premium markets of Southeast Asia.
On which the Americans are more or less clear.
And which, in any case, cover the European markets in terms of price, like a bull, excuse me, a sheep.
Consequently, in such a situation, the options for the eurozone countries, in general, are few - it is necessary to go to the Russians.
Accordingly, either somehow negotiating with the Americans, or paying off with something banal from them.
In the citadel of world democracy, this is actively practiced, they can.
It is impossible for others.
And here the most interesting thing begins, because the Russians, too, do not just understand the current situation - they themselves diligently, for many years, have been forming their own energy policy.
Perhaps controversial, from the point of view of many experts, but quite progressive and, most importantly, transparent and working.
For these Russians are strange people from the point of view of the current fragile state of the world: they first think what they say, and then they also do what they think.
Which plunges the same European community into depression and cognitive dissonance.
Well, Europeans in this case really can only sympathize
This is true.
And, by the way, this is why the Russians (in the person of the domestic Gazprom) are so demonstratively calm about the completion of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. will surely finish), despite all the political storms raging in the Brussels swamps.
Everything is really simple here.
We are not now imposing on the Europeans not only our vaccine against COVID-19, as President Putin was recently forced to remind Brussels politicians.
We do not impose our energy resources on Europe either.
Neither oil nor gas.
And what, excuse me, is the point of imposing something on Europe if the trend has changed predictably?
And under the new conditions, both Russian oil and Russian gas are, if you will, a bit of a scarce commodity: it is not for nothing that even the United States last week renewed the record for Russian oil exports, held since 2011.
And they did it despite the global crisis and in the absence of even any hint of Russian-American affection.
What kind of friendliness is there - it's scary to look at TV.
It's just that the Americans need our heavy oil for a number of purely technological reasons, which have been described many times.
And they really find it most convenient to buy this oil from the Russians.
And it is profitable for us to sell this oil.
That's all.
This world, when necessary, is generally pragmatic to the point of disgrace.
Only here the question is that for the Europeans, Russian gas, especially pipeline gas (including the one that will soon go along the unfinished Nord Stream 2), is much, much more important than even the Americans are Russian heavy oil, which they have we are bought so diligently.
For Europeans, to a certain extent, this is generally a question of survival: not physical survival, of course, but so far only energy and, therefore, economic.
For us, the supply of gas to European markets is, to be precise in the wording, just a matter of preserving traditional markets.
Locally very important, but far from so sharp and, it is certainly not existential.
Not a matter of life and death, in short, if it's really quite simple to say.
And this must be understood very clearly and with utmost responsibility.
Because this, among other things, is, apparently, our trade position: we will do our part of the work, but we do not intend to drag the chestnuts out of the fire for anyone else, and Europe will have to do its part of the work itself.
Including on countering American sanctions.
In principle, responsible European politicians and business circles, of course, already understand this plot twist quite well.
And the fact of a sharp reduction in gas in UGS facilities is just enough convincingly emphasized once again.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.