The past year did not bring decisive changes to the BV (Middle East), and the new year was postponed until the end of January.
While we do not know how the change of power in the United States will end (presumably, January 20), 2020 continues, or rather, the timelessness that began in November with the American elections continues.
Timelessness is everywhere - and in the Middle East, where Trump's initiative to withdraw American soldiers from Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq has been stuck;
the conflict with Iran is frozen;
the question of power in Israel is hanging;
hung civil wars in Yemen, Libya and Syria.
Russia and Turkey have come to the fore.
As in the 19th century, these two powers dominate the region.
Behind more than a hundred years, when they were pushed aside by the Europeans and the Europeans (together with their North American cousins) solved all issues to their own delight, and the local population at a loss.
Now that Russia and Turkey are in the game again, the future of the BW depends on the ability of these two powers to come to an agreement.
President Putin understands the importance of partnership with Turkey.
It is not for nothing that at the last press conference he emphasized his good business relations with President Erdogan and his negotiability.
Erdogan cares about the welfare of Turkey - this makes his actions predictable, and he himself is able to keep his word.
In contrast to Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states, where the leaders care more about the sympathies of Washington and Brussels, and do not fulfill the agreements at all.
So far, Turkey and Russia have not been able to fully resolve the problem of Syria and Libya, but positive shifts have been outlined in these two countries, brought down by the European interventionists.
However, there too, much depends on Washington's policy in the new year.
If the focus on the withdrawal of American troops and the reduction of American intervention continues, it will be easier to negotiate.
If the United States decides to intervene more actively, the situation may change for the worse.
Turkey has many conflicts in the region.
Dispute over the shelf with Greece, supported by France, Israel, Egypt.
Russia is neutral on this very important issue.
The essence of the dispute is this: the shelf and waters were divided between Turkey and Greece at the Lausanne conference a hundred years ago.
During this time, Turkey has become many times stronger, and it is not satisfied with the conditions imposed a hundred years ago with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
The Greeks should make certain concessions, but there is hardly a Greek government capable of such a bold step.
This conflict is fraught with military confrontation.
Dispute in Libya, where the pro-Turkish government of Tripoli is waging an unsuccessful protracted war against Benghazi.
And here Egypt supports Benghazi.
Russia maintains good relations with Benghazi and Tripoli, but would not like Tripoli's complete military victory and Turkey's noticeable strengthening.
I would like the Libyans to be able to agree among themselves in 2021 so that Russia retains its position.
The dispute in Syria, where the intractable question "What to do with Idlib?"
Let me remind you that there are Syrians in Idlib who do not agree to reconcile with Assad and Damascus.
Turkey does not want so many refugees at home, it would prefer to keep a piece of Syria beyond the control of Assad, so that disgruntled Syrians can live there.
But this contradicts the principle of the integrity of Syria, to which Erdogan and Putin are signed.
Perhaps this problem will be resolved in 2021, but how - by military means or through negotiations - remains unclear.
Despite the agreements, Russia would prefer Turkey to show more flexibility on Syria and concede.
Objectively speaking, Turkey's conflict with the European Union, primarily with France, plays into Russia's hands.
He weakens Turkey.
There is also a dispute between Turkey and the United States related to the purchase of Russian air defense systems, as well as to US attempts to carry out a regime change in Turkey.
In February it will become clearer what is the position of the new US administration on Turkey.
Perhaps Biden will try to get closer to Erdogan.
Iran, the third side of the "Astana triangle" and an important partner of Russia and Turkey, is in a difficult position.
President Trump was fiercely hostile to Iran, and the new administration should be expected to moderate its hostility.
But, since the animosity is caused by the Israeli lobby, the changes are unlikely to be dramatic.
This means that we can expect the continuation of sanctions against Iran and balancing on the brink of war.
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is extremely hostile towards Iran, and on this he agrees with Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia.
There are wars in Syria and Yemen, involving Iran on the one side and Saudi Arabia on the other.
Still, there will be 80 out of 100 chances that there will be no direct war with Iran this year either.
Israel went to the polls three times in the past year, new elections are already scheduled for March.
There is a tough political struggle in the country.
The prime minister, who is threatened with prison, is under attack.
Let's see if Netanyahu will be able to win in the new elections - this is very likely.
Israel is suffering from COVID-19 and tough anti-coronavirus measures.
This is the third lockdown in the country, with Netanyahu's opponents insisting on even harsher measures and prolonged lockdowns.
These are mostly well-to-do liberal strata of society, close to Biden's Democrats.
But small businesses and workers are suffering lockdowns.
This means they are more likely to support Netanyahu.
There is not much difference between Netanyahu and his leading opponents on any issue.
Both Beni Gantz and Bibi Netanyahu can unleash a war, but Bibi still tried to avoid wars.
Netanyahu maintains good relations with Russia, and his main opponent Benny Gantz does not understand why this is necessary.
The complex and explosive situation in Israel will last at least until March, and January will seem the most alarming.
Palestine found itself in a difficult position.
Last year, President Trump brought several Arab and Muslim countries to peace with Israel.
The principle of "peace for territories", which underpinned the peace process, was ordered to live long.
Talks about the independence of Palestine, which have been going on for many years, are becoming unrealistic;
if Biden wants to resume them, then only for another long-term red tape.
Unfortunately, while the Israeli people do not want to make concessions to the Palestinians, they have already given up everything that could have been given up.
The Palestinians have only one way out - to demand full equality with the Jews in Israel within the framework of a single state.
Russia supports the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, but this right can be realized in Israel, if the rights are equal.
If the Israelis do not want to grant equal rights, the Palestinians will have other, more harsh options.
Egypt is also in a difficult position.
He supports General Khalifa Haftar and the parliament in eastern Libya.
President al-Sisi is threatening direct military intervention if Tripoli's forces pass Sirte, halfway to Benghazi.
Egypt is in conflict with Turkey on the shelf and in Libya.
But the main danger for Egypt is the emerging conflict with Ethiopia.
This country is going to cut off the sources of the Nile and leave Egypt without water.
Egypt cannot allow this, but Ethiopia and its burgeoning population need water.
And finally, the Middle East is threatened by natural hazards: COVID-19, the consequences of the fight against the coronavirus, locust raids, and rising summer temperatures.
It is difficult to expect great success in BV, but the overall dire situation could bring together old opponents.
Russia constantly and consistently stands on the side of peace, mutual respect, sovereignty - and therefore the peoples and rulers of the Middle East are drawn to it.
The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.