The region of the Middle East and North Africa is chronically unlucky - after the beginning of the Arab Spring, these countries become territories of "wars on the periphery".
These are geopolitical sandboxes where regional and great powers play and solve their conflicts.
And if in 2020 these wars were fought in two countries - Syria and Yemen - then in 2021 Libya can fully join them.
Where (in contrast to the practically won back Syrian platform and the Yemeni one, which is close to a political solution), everything is just beginning.
And all thanks to Turkey, which, at the invitation of the internationally recognized authorities of the country in Tripoli, led by Faiz Saraj (one of the parties to the Libyan civil war, the second is Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar based in Benghazi, on whose side most of the army and parliament) sent troops to Libya.
It did not introduce charity for the sake of it - Ankara is trying to protect its national interests there, as well as its own vision of the geopolitical alignment in the Mediterranean.
For Turkey, which is living in a systemic conflict with the European Union, Libyan territory presents a number of very promising opportunities.
First of all, oil and gas - not only because Libya has huge reserves of hydrocarbons, but also because the EU needs their uninterrupted supply within the framework of the European policy of "diversification".
So far, there is a problem with continuity - there is no central government in Libya, so local tribes can simply block the operation of terminals, based on their personal interests.
Turkish troops, if they wish, can easily solve this problem, because the Libyans living in conditions of intertribal relations sacredly honor the symbol "subjugate the weak, crush the stronger, obey the too strong."
After that, Ankara will not only extract income from these fields, but also open or close oil and gas taps for European consumers if they wish.
Control over Libya also provides military and political opportunities.
With all due respect to Yemen (located near the main oil transportation routes) and Syria (located in the center of the Middle East), the geopolitical significance of Libya is much more serious.
The country has a long coastline, along which it is convenient to place naval bases - exactly at the underbelly of Europe.
In addition, the configuration of this coast allowed Turkey to conclude an agreement with Faiz Saraj on the delimitation of exclusive economic zones in such a way that these zones touch and cut off the entire eastern Mediterranean from the western.
That is, roughly speaking, if the Cypriots, Egyptians or Israelis decide to pull the pipeline from their offshore fields to European markets by sea, they will pass either through Turkish or Libyan (that is, in the case of Ankara's control over Tripoli, read, also Turkish) territory.
Or they will not exist at all - if Turkey prohibits laying.
Finally, control over Libya also provides migration opportunities - North Africa is the second (along with the Middle East) reservoir of refugees who seek to get into the European Union.
And Libya is the bottleneck for them.
It is on the coast of this country that they sit in their fragile little boats, after which the luckiest part of them swims to the coast of Italy.
Control over Libya will allow Erdogan to turn the neck into a gateway (as Gaddafi once did) and use it to blackmail the European Union on political and economic issues.
All the more so now, when, after the terrorist attacks in France and Austria, Europe is seriously concerned about the presence of a huge number of non-integrated Muslims on its territory.
The combination of clearly defined national interests, political will and a legitimate military presence makes Turkey's position in Libya very serious.
The Turkish military is not only at the bases, but also actively interact with the units loyal to Faiz Saraj - in particular, they train them.
The main obstacle to the implementation of the Turkish plan is the eastern part of the country not controlled by Ankara and Khalifa Haftar.
Yes, thanks to Turkish drones, attempts by forces loyal to Haftar to seize Tripoli have failed - however, the field marshal and his people control most of the country's oil and gas fields.
In this regard, the statements of Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, who recently paid a visit to Libya, are curious.
He bluntly stated that an attack by Haftar's forces on Turkish soldiers (the likelihood of which is high, given the ongoing hostilities and the integration of the Turkish Armed Forces into the troops of Saraj) will entail "the transformation of the war criminal and assassin of Haftar into a legitimate target."
That is, in translation from diplomatic to Russian, Turkey reserves the right at any time to announce an attack on Turkish soldiers and send drones to eliminate Khalifa Haftar.
From a military point of view, this is not difficult to do - the Libyans have never found effective means of protection against Turkish drones, and the organizational and financial capabilities of Ankara's intelligence to identify the whereabouts of Khalifa Haftar should not be underestimated.
Problems may arise politically - after all, behind the field marshal are not only Libyan tribes (whose loyalty is unreliable - see the principle “subjugate the weak, crush the strengthened, obey the too strong”), but also a whole bunch of foreign countries.
And while Ankara is thinking about what to do, the weak point of Turkish policy is exposed - the lack of an alternative to military action.
The fact is that in Libya, as in other fields where Erdogan plays, he can put pressure, but at the same time he is not able to design the negotiation process.
Because of the overly aggressive attitude and also because the Turks put all their eggs in one basket.
Therefore, now the rivals of the Turks in the struggle for control over Libya are the Egyptians.
Cairo officially supports Khalifa Haftar, however - unlike Ankara - does not threaten Saraj and his government with physical destruction.
Instead, the Egyptian authorities are trying to play the role of intermediaries.
Immediately after Hulusi Akar, a high-ranking delegation of the Egyptian military arrived in Tripoli.
Apparently, the Egyptians are trying to sponsor a peace agreement between Tripoli and Benghazi - and in exchange they will want to legitimize their control over the eastern part of the country, leaving the western part to the Turks.
Erdogan is clearly not satisfied with this.
The question is, what can he do in this situation?
To remain silent, to sabotage the process through undercover negotiations - or to turn the chessboard over through actions against Khalifa Haftar?
The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.