As a matter of fact, no matter what the outcome of this protracted extraordinary summit of EU leaders in Brussels ends, it’s already clear that even if everything ends this time more or less successfully (which, by the way, we sincerely hope for, for the upheavals right now, within continental Europe, we, the Russian Federation, need the least), all the same, the contradictions that have accumulated there in recent years are not just “not overcome”, but, on the contrary, are acquiring, we would say, structural in nature. In which the possibilities of compromise, of course, still remain. But more and more often, almost all the participants in the process are faced with, to put it mildly, an intractable question in relation to the “cost” of this very “compromise”: does this price exceed the economic pluses for which it is proposed to pay the European states once again.

What is there to understand.

Despite the unconditional practical importance of the ongoing summit, the problems that were supposed to be resolved at it are nevertheless more likely to be purely practical, and by no means fundamental. That is, the opportunity to somehow agree on these issues was not just there, it was originally implied, and there isn’t even any subject for dispute: literally all EU countries are interested in the practical adoption of the final documents, as quickly as possible, now, you know, the crisis , will not wait long, it is necessary to act directly here and now.

Yes, there is such an urgent need: to agree, for example, on the creation of a new, temporary EU anti-crisis fund, connected, naturally, with the consequences of the pandemic that is still ongoing, albeit gradually officially subsiding, on the European continent. Moreover, it’s even clear what kind of sums we are talking about: the European Commission from the very beginning proposed that the size of the new fund be € 750 billion (while the summit participants, judging by the “leaks”, didn’t even agree on this), which it would take on global financial markets. It was proposed to allocate funds to the needy countries of the European Union in the form of either loans or subsidies (“grants”), and it was here that the first uncontrollable “el scandal” arose: how much money will be issued from it to the EU countries for free, and how much in preferential terms loans. It turned out to be much more difficult to agree than originally intended.

However, these were still flowers.

Another, much more, to our taste, a complex and important issue for the future of the European Union, namely, the decision on the EU financial plan, on the basis of which annual union budgets for 2021-2027 are drawn up, remained in the shade. Including precisely because it was supposed to be tactically linked to the anti-crisis fund, because in order to attract funds on the market, the European Commission was going to adjust certain budget indicators, as well as channel anti-crisis fund funds through budget programs.

But the question, as they say, is dependent.

Moreover, it cannot be said that this happened so unexpectedly, including for outside observers: on the contrary, what was politely called a “heated discussion” was quite expected at the summit.

They did not expect that the matter would go so far that it, this summit (and the heads of state is people, sorry, busy) will even have to be extended several times, moreover, with approximately the same result: it’s no coincidence on Friday, after the first working session, the Prime Minister Czech Republic Andrei Babish told the media that the views of the meeting on the economic recovery fund are so diametrically opposed that it’s not even clear how to bring them together.

Brought, of course. How could.

But a little, sorry, not completely.

In fact, the main differences at the summit were fairly accurately described in a conversation with journalists by another East European leader, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban: these are contradictions between the states of the poor south of Europe, whose interests in this particular case, according to Orban, are expressed by Italy and Hungary, and the countries of the rich North, the most rigid positions among which are Denmark and the Netherlands.

Well, yes, of course, here the Hungarian prime minister decently simplifies: the fault line in Europe runs not only and not so much along the north / south line, and indeed it is now far from the only one on the European continent, the deck is shuffled very, very bizarrely. It’s just enough to say that the “club of donors of the rich north”, opposing, according to Orban, the “poor south”, includes - along with Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden - and is pretty close in many matters - including historical and, sorry, purely geographical - to Hungary Austria. But Orban is certainly right in describing precisely tactical contradictions on specific issues that were considered at the summit.

Here, in general, everything is quite simple and it sounds rather scary for the future of the European Union: in fact, we are talking about fundamentally different approaches not only to the economy, but to the organization of life in general.

In short.

There are states in the south of Europe, first of all, we are talking about Italy and Spain, for which everything was not very fun with the economy (and at the same time they were seriously affected by the pandemic), which urgently needed help, especially financial. There are states of the “lean four” (the Netherlands, whose premieres were announced the main villain at the summit, as well as Denmark, Austria and Sweden), which, in general, also suffered from the pandemic (and who did not suffer from it?) And who agree that sub need help. But they do not agree that this assistance is for the most part "irrevocable", and therefore, at their expense.

And there are Germany and France, which, having an export-oriented economy, are primarily interested in restoring their own sales markets. And they, in principle, are ready to support "free aid", but, in fact, in exchange for the remnants of southern sovereignty.

Which equally does not suit either the north (to which it, this southern sovereignty, is not really needed, they are good without it), or the south, which is poor but proud. Not by the way, the East (Hungary and Poland), who are not ready to link aid even with the "rule of European law and the separation of powers": and this is also a very long and very sad story about Polish and Hungarian banks and courts, which the EU states at this summit definitely not overcome.

Why is all of this lengthy and ineffective meeting interesting to us? Yes, it’s very simple: because everything that is happening now in the “Brussels impasse” is not even a crisis, it is just a shadow of the crisis, its reflection.

Moreover, it is precisely that of the systemic economic and socio-political crisis of the European Union, as an entity that included in its first economic and then socio-political integrity peoples and countries with fundamentally different historical destinies.

And unfortunately, as it turns out, these countries are able to act in a very consolidated and joint manner only with a strong political will capable of forcing them: remember how coordinated, for example, and often even with serious damage to their own economic interests, the EU countries acted under the imposition of sanctions against the Russian Federation “for Ukraine and Crimea”: yes, they acted so under the powerful pressure of the political will of the United States, but coordination here is simply impossible not to note, because it was in fact at an unprecedented organizational height. As for the EU’s internal problems, this transatlantic “political will” simply doesn’t have much to do, everyone survives alone: ​​here Brussels shows us simply amazing impotence, and in matters much more vital for him, Brussels.

And someone may like it, someone may not like it - but alas, this is an objective reality given to us in our senses: how to build long-term strategic relations with such an intricate and lacking political will structure, which is also, for a second, Our leading trade and economic partner is a very big question. And now I’ll say a very seditious thought: maybe it is just this, and not some special passion for Asian culture, that prompted the desire of the state of the Russian Federation to properly “turn east”.

Because, of course, there are quite complicated negotiators and people with a culture far more distant from us, including the “economic culture” and the “business culture”, but at least it’s clear what to expect from them. Plus, there (well, maybe, except Japan), all states have sufficient sovereignty to formulate their own, and not overseas economic interests. And that means that there is something to talk about with them, even if it is sometimes very difficult.

But there is a subject for negotiations, and they can, in principle, be responsible for their words.

Because they are corny competent.

What can be strategically negotiated with such an EU is a very big question.

The author’s point of view may not coincide with the position of the publisher.