[Interview file] The prolonged silence of North Korea Shall we watch? Will it move?

North Korea's silence over the results of the US presidential election is growing.

Biden's presidential election was confirmed on the 8th, so it has already been 5 days, but the North Korean media have not even reported a brief fact about Biden's election.

Compared to reporting the results of the US presidential election in two days when Obama was elected in 2008, in three days when Obama reelected in 2012, and in two days when Trump was elected in 2016, this time the silence is getting considerably longer.

It is also understandable that the silence in North Korea is prolonged.

Biden said he won the presidential election, but we need to see how the situation in the United States will go amid President Trump's disagreement, and observe how President-elect Biden, who is likely to overturn Trump's policy considerably, will express his position on North Korea.

Although there are some things Biden said about North Korea before the presidential election, it is important to North Korea how Biden's work toward North Korea will come out because the words before and after the election have different weights.

Options Near the

Regardless of how Biden's work toward North Korea emerges, North Korea is faced with a situation where it is necessary to find a new way of diplomacy with the United States.

This is because it is unlikely that US-North Korea relations will roll in a way that emphasizes the closeness between the two leaders of the United States as in the days of President Trump.

In the future, the US-North Korea talks are likely to work beyond meetings for'taking pictures' and only work as long as there is something practical.

In such a situation, ahead of the end of the year, North Korea has to choose between two options.

First, it is to watch the fluid situation first.

As the US administration changes, we don't know how the new government's policy toward North Korea will be formulated, so rather than stimulating the new US government through provocations, we look at the situation and find room for negotiation.

It seems that our government and many North Korean experts are making this hopeful observation.

The second option is to demonstrate North Korea's nuclear capabilities through strategic provocations such as SLBM or ICBM launch, and then negotiate with the new US administration next year.

In the case of a large-scale strategic provocation, there may be additional sanctions from the United Nations, but it is difficult to enforce strong sanctions against North Korea in a situation where US leadership is not functioning properly due to the aftereffects of the presidential election.

In addition, even if additional sanctions are imposed, there seems to be little worse for North Korea than it is now, when borders are already blocked due to coronavirus.

After showing the advanced nuclear capability, it can be calculated that if we go to the negotiating phase next year, the bargaining power of North Korea will increase as much as the developed nuclear capability, so it is ultimately advantageous for North Korea.

The first option to look at can be adopted when North Korea tries to obtain something else by using nuclear weapons as a means of negotiation.

This is because if you think that nuclear weapons are not the ultimate goal, but that you can get counter-benefits such as security guarantees and economic support through nuclear weapons, and you can give up nuclear weapons in some circumstances, it is not necessary to stimulate the new US government from the beginning. .

However, if North Korea is ultimately aiming to possess a nuclear weapon, if it is firmly convinced that it will ensure the security of the regime, it is likely that the second option for strategic provocation will be adopted.

This is because now that the US leadership is shaking, it is an excellent opportunity for North Korea to demonstrate its advanced nuclear capabilities.

It can be thought to be enough to show improved nuclear capabilities during the period of political turmoil in the United States, and to negotiate with the United States as a nuclear power.

The negotiations here are not negotiations for denuclearization, but negotiations that take place while North Korea's nuclear weapons have been established.

Although North Korea showed off its ICBM's ability to send a Hwaseong-15 launch to the United States in November 2017, the Hwaseong-15 launch was only made once, and the warhead's atmospheric reentry technology has not been verified.

There is a controversy over whether the new ICBM, which was unveiled at the 75th anniversary of its founding on the 10th of last month, is also a real or a model, and a test launch is necessary to clear the controversy.

This means that there are still mountains to overcome in relation to ICBM for North Korea.

Even if the Biden administration is launched in January of next year, it will take months for the government to settle down through a ministerial hearing, so North Korea has time to switch to negotiation mode after provocation.

After the presidential election, Trump's sudden personality, so we will observe a little more about how the US market is going, but as soon as the situation in the United States is cleared up, North Korea's options will appear on the surface.