Jens Weidman's withdrawal from the presidency of the Deutsche Bundesbank and thus also from the Central Bank Council of the European Central Bank is sobering news in itself.

At a time when, for the first time in many years, inflation is becoming a serious and possibly more permanent problem than previously thought, the news of his withdrawal is downright disturbing.

Anyone who knows Weidmann knows that his decision should not be interpreted as desertion - but as a signal of frustration at the development of monetary policy. And as an expression of concern that the ECB will no longer allow itself to be held back on its way into a downward monetary policy.

If, in a situation in which the inflation rate in Germany is likely to reach the mark of 5 percent this year, the ECB comes to the conclusion that the real problem is that the inflation rate could be too low in the coming year, the institution wakes up Frankfurt's Ostend gives the impression of being far removed from people's worries.

When the chief economist of the ECB says that even a wage rise as a result of the current rise in price levels will not require a change in monetary policy, the question arises whether the ECB wants to take the issue of inflation seriously again at all.

Disillusionment with Berlin

Statements by other members of the Central Bank Council suggest that they are primarily interested in continuing large-scale government bond purchases even after the end of the pandemic.

Weidmann is not alone in his warnings that monetary and financial policy is too closely intertwined in the Central Bank Council, but he only represents a minority in the body.

Anyone who also suspects that Weidmann's withdrawal is a disillusionment about a lack of political support in Berlin will not be wrong.

In the past, the current government was not unhappy with the fact that the ECB took on an increasingly active role in combating the crises and thus at least expanded its mandate.

Anyone who follows the current debates about a softening of the financial stability criteria in the European Union and the possibilities of a creative circumvention of the debt brake suspects that the ECB will have to be ready in the future to buy large holdings of government bonds if necessary. With a view to the international situation, one could say that such an entanglement of monetary and financial policy is in line with the times. But it does not fit - not only for constitutional reasons - with a federal bank tradition to which Weidmann feels obliged.

The next federal government will have the opportunity to fill the presidency of the Deutsche Bundesbank with a person who feels less committed to the old Bundesbank tradition but more committed to modern international monetary policy.

That can turn out to be bad news.