Mr. Ploss, a major research summit this Wednesday will deal with the quality and deficiencies of Germany as a location for innovation - at the same time, a lack of microchips is paralyzing industry.

How much do the two have to do with each other?

Dietrich Creutzburg

Business correspondent in Berlin.

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    Actually little.

    But if you ask me like that, then this shortage has an indirect positive aspect: The very high demand for chips in German industry demonstrates how highly innovative it is in fields such as digitization in automobiles and electromobility.

    It is able to actively shape the car trend towards digitalization, towards electric and assisted driving.

    In this respect, we are obviously doing well in Germany.

    It is important to maintain your position with autonomous driving.

    But missing chips are a stumbling block?

    Of course, there is the problem of an acute shortage, which is particularly evident in the automotive industry.

    We see the temporary overload of a system because several markets are booming, mainly driven by the pandemic.

    That will normalize again in the medium term.

    Nevertheless, it refers to a topic that is also an exciting research question - the resilience of systems: How well are economic or social structures equipped to deal with unexpected shocks?

    This applies, among other things, to the question of how much autonomy we need in the value and supply chains.

    How much more autonomy do we need - and to what extent is that a task for industrial and innovation policy?

    Ultimately, that's a job for companies.

    But of course there are overarching questions: Where does Europe and Germany have to have independent competencies in order to be able to access the knowledge necessary for innovation at eye level with other regions of the world?

    That doesn't mean that we have to do everything ourselves here.

    An example from the early days of the pandemic: mass mask production can be achieved in a few weeks if necessary.

    Therefore, one does not have to permanently maintain a production capacity for the theoretical maximum demand for masks in Germany.

    With complex technologies - whether artificial intelligence or genetic engineering - it is better not to rely on being able to repair suddenly occurring gaps in ad-hoc mode.

    Is politics doing too little here to ensure autonomy?

    I would not agree with that across the board.

    In comparison with the USA or China, however, one can see that the state there is in some areas much more aggressive state funding for technology.

    This partly runs indirectly through the military budget, partly directly as the promotion of national economic interests, partly indirectly through state procurement.

    These are factors in global competition that you don't have to find good, but which are real.

    Should Europe follow suit?

    It would be a change of course for Europe not to exacerbate imbalances - for example in the procurement policy of public authorities. The most important criterion is usually the cheapest price, and today this often favors the partially artificially cheaper product from China or other regions, less the offer from local production. In no way do I advocate subsidizing industries at will. But how great the importance of the procurement policy is, we can see in the success story of BioNTech: The state simply ordered large quantities from this local company. Ultimately, this is more decisive for its long-term success than the fact that government research funding was previously granted.