The Houthis were able to seize weapons and equipment stores of the former Yemeni army (Al Jazeera)
The Al Jazeera Net website publishes an integrated file entitled “The Axis of Resistance... The Idea and Its Limits,” which discusses in detail the idea of the axis, the indications for its founding, the history of its formation, and its contexts.
The file also addresses the edges of the axis that revolve in its orbit and are linked to its nucleus, and the spaces in which they operate, and describes the states of polarization and repulsion between its components and their surroundings.
In the file, we examine the relationship of the axis with the Palestinian resistance, which in the Gaza Strip - led by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) - is waging the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle against the Israeli aggression that has been ongoing for 110 days.
The file will be published as a series of episodes. We will begin by talking about Iran as the nucleus of this axis, then we will talk about Syria, the golden link in it. In talking about Hezbollah, we will discuss the attack strategy within the rules of engagement, and in Iraq, the militias affiliated with the axis from its founding until the flood operation, and finally we will examine how it arrived. The Houthis to the sea.
Link to the first episode: Iran...the idea of the axis and its limits
Link to the second episode: Syria, the golden ring
Saad Al-Wahidi
On Friday morning, January 12, the United States and Britain launched air and missile strikes on several military sites belonging to the Ansar Allah group, the Houthis, in the capital, Sanaa, their stronghold of Saada, and several Yemeni cities.
These attacks came weeks after it announced on December 18, 2023, the establishment of a military coalition to secure navigation in the Red Sea, called “Guardian of Prosperity,” with the aim of confronting Houthi attacks.
The attacks continued at a slower pace, but the spark of the battle launched by America moved the regional confrontation that followed the outbreak of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle to new paths on the ground and militarily.
The start of the missile air attack was preceded by cracks in the walls of the “Guardian of Prosperity” when Spain, Italy and France announced their refusal to participate in it, or to sign a statement supporting the operation.
Attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea continued, and the vicinity of Bab al-Mandab has today become a global combat node and a symbol of the Yemeni siege of Israel.
The attacks reached even further, targeting an Israeli container ship with a drone off the coast of India in the Indian Ocean, making this attack the farthest in scope, even if the Houthis did not claim responsibility for it.
Who are Ansar Allah "Houthis"?
The Houthis are an armed political movement that started from Saada Governorate in northern Yemen. The beginnings of its founding go back to the Zaidi cleric, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who in 1991 founded the “Believer Youth” organization to be a preaching and intellectual wing of the Zaidi “Islamic Right Party.” Since its founding, it has gone through a number of It is one of the pivotal historical stations that charted its course and future.
The disputes between Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his sons, on the one hand, and leaders in the Al-Haq Party, on the other hand, prompted the severing of relations between the young believers and the party, and the Houthi family devoted themselves to expanding the activity of their organization and imposing its presence in northern Yemen, by building centers for advocacy and community work and mosques, to attract and recruit tribesmen. In its ranks.
In 2000, Hussein al-Houthi, son of Badr al-Din al-Houthi, launched the “Ansar Allah” movement, which in 2002 adopted the slogan “The Scream” as a political slogan for the movement, which his supporters repeat after every prayer: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory.” for Islam,” and the organization makes it its banner and flag.
The Ansar Allah group inherited the religious and political symbolism of the believing youth, but it presents itself as a new group with new ideas and working methodologies that differ from those that formed the foundations and launch factors for the believing youth. The group fought several armed confrontations with the Yemeni army, the first of which was the confrontation in 2004, which was known as “ “Saada War,” in which Hussein al-Houthi, the group’s leader, was killed.
Following the killing of Hussein al-Houthi, his father, Badr al-Din, took over the reins of the group, then entrusted them to his younger son, Abdul Malik, who assumed the leadership of the movement from that date, until 2015, which witnessed the group and its allies taking control of the capital, Sanaa, the siege of the Republican Palace, and the escape of President Abd Rabbuh Mansour. Hadi to Saudi Arabia, and the start of the “Decisive Storm” military operation, which included an Arab coalition of 10 countries.
Decisive Storm ended with the signing of a temporary truce agreement that lasted only 6 months from April 2 until October 2, 2022. The agreement officially ended after the Houthis refused to renew it, but the policy of reducing escalation continues until now, and the regional mediators are seeking to reach an expanded truce agreement.
From Zaidi to Twelver
The beginnings of the documented relations between Al-Houthi and Iran go back to the year 1985, when Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi arrived on a trip to the Iranian city of Qom, which he used as a center to receive young people coming from his hometown of Saada Governorate, until 1988, which witnessed the arrival of his sons Hussein and Abdul-Malik, as well as Muhammad Azzan. Secretary of the Faithful Youth, and his deputy, Abdul Karim Jadban, and their meeting with the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Khamenei, and Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Despite the Houthis belonging to the Jarudi sect, which is described as closer to the Zaidi sect than to the Twelver sect, and despite their clear religious and political relationship with Iran, disagreements remained among specialists about the fact that the Houthis converted to the Twelver sect or were close to it.
What increases the difficulty of ascertaining this point is the clear lack of recognition by the Houthis of adopting the Twelver doctrine, and the nature of the Shiite doctrine in general, which tends to be kept secret, despite the presence of evidence that some see as indications of the reality of this transformation, including video lessons by Hussein al-Houthi in which he attacks the venerable Caliph Omar. Ibn Al-Khattab, whom the Zaidis believe is the successor to the Messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace), and they disagree with the general Shiite doctrine in criticizing him.
While the Yemeni researcher Ahmed Al-Daghashi believes in his book “The Houthis... a comprehensive methodological study,” that “contrary to the common belief that the founder of Houthiism, Hussein Al-Houthi, was an absolute follower of the Twelver Imami coming from Iran or Lebanon, it has become clear that Hussein Al-Houthi is in complete disagreement with the Twelver Imami thought.” The most prominent evidence of this is his position that strongly rejects the idea of the Hidden Twelfth Imam and his warning against the establishment of the Imami school of thought in Yemen. Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, in a meeting with a popular delegation from the city of Shabwa in 2015, accused the Houthis of “spreading the Twelver school of thought in Yemen by force of arms.” ".
The journey of Iranian support for the Houthis
Iranian support for the Houthis took three main paths in the years before they took control of the reins of government in Yemen. The beginnings of this support go back to the mid-1990s until 2004. It focused first on intellectual and financial support, as part of Hussein Al-Houthi’s methodology to strengthen his presence as a prominent force in the Zaidi community in Saada. And its surroundings, and its ability to recruit followers and penetrate tribes.
Financial and intellectual support contributed to the inauguration and opening of training centers and summer camps, the number of which reached 24 centers in Saada alone, in addition to 41 centers in the rest of the northern governorates, including Dhamar, Ibb, Sana’a, and Al Mahwit.
As stated in the book “The Houthis in Yemen: Sectarian Ambitions in Light of International Transformations” (2008), the Yemeni Minister of Interior spoke about the charge d’affaires of the Iranian embassy at the time taking over the process of transferring money in cash to the Houthis during his trips overland to Mecca via Saada to perform Umrah.
Iran also provided, at the time, and still does, an annual quota for the followers of Hussein Al-Houthi in Iranian universities and seminaries in Qom and elsewhere, where Al-Houthi sent hundreds of students to receive religious education in Iran, and then returned to Yemen to contribute to promoting his group among the Zaidi sect.
As for the second path of Iranian support for Al-Houthi, it is military support, which began after the explosion of the first armed confrontation between the young believers and the Yemeni army in 2004, and the subsequent wars and confrontations known in the media as the “Six Saada Wars,” which witnessed the killing of Hussein Al-Houthi at the hands of the Yemeni army. Who claimed at the time that weapons of Iranian origin were found in Saada, in addition to accusations against Iran of providing Al-Houthi with funds to purchase weapons, and sending trainers from the Revolutionary Guard to lead the combat maneuvers that were being conducted by supporters of Hussein Al-Houthi.
As for the last path, it was media support to the world for the Houthi wars with the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime, as Iran sought to portray the confrontation as a Shiite minority fighting for sectarian reasons. Shiite authorities also issued statements accusing the Yemeni government of genocide, in addition to the widespread media coverage of the Houthi confrontations. Through Iranian channels and media, especially the “Al-Alam” channel.
Until now, the features of the relationship between the Houthis and Iran are unclear, and it cannot be predicted how deep it is, despite the official Iranian recognition that “Ansar Allah” forms part of the regional “resistance axis,” the Houthis’ recognition that Iran constitutes the leadership of this axis, and the letters of thanks sent by Abdul King Houthi publicly denies Iran’s role in Yemen. From time to time, Iran does not hesitate to deny the subordination of the Yemeni decision to it, and renews its emphasis on the freedom and independence of the Yemeni decision.
Throughout the years of war in Yemen, which accompanied Operation Decisive Storm, the Saudi-led Arab coalition has repeatedly accused Iran of arming and training the Houthis, allegations that were previously pointed out by international investigators and others affiliated with the United Nations in 2016, in addition to both the American and French State Departments. And other parties spoke about monitoring the paths of direct Iranian support and arming of the Houthis through Somalia.
It is noteworthy that after the Ansar Allah forces took control of Sanaa, the major countries and Gulf capitals withdrew their ambassadors from the Yemeni capital, and the Houthis faced international isolation, to which they responded by launching a direct air bridge with Iran, which pledged to secure fuel and build electricity generation plants in the areas under their control, and it continued to film Their control of the reins of government is considered a "Yemeni popular revolution."
How did Al-Houthi reach the sea?
In 2015, Houthi forces took control of the strategic port of Hodeidah in western Yemen, through which 80% of the country’s imports and foreign aid pass.
This control was followed by intense raids launched by the Arab coalition on the port, which caused widespread destruction to its facilities, in addition to a military siege of it in response to the Houthi bombing of Saudi Arabia with a ballistic missile in 2017. Then the siege was partially lifted weeks later.
In 2017, the Houthis threatened to “attack battleships and oil tankers,” in response to the Saudi-led coalition’s closure of Yemeni ports, which is what Abdul-Malik al-Houthi previously threatened, saying that his group “may target Saudi oil tankers if the coalition attacks the main port of Hodeidah in Yemen". Previously, in 2016, the Houthis targeted the “Swift” ship, which the coalition described as “civilian,” noting that it was on a trip to the city of Aden, while the Houthis said it was “a military ship that was advancing toward the port of Mokha.”
In 2018, Saudi Arabia suspended oil exports through Bab al-Mandab for weeks, after the Houthis targeted two ships loaded with oil in the Red Sea. The Houthis said at the time that they had targeted the Saudi warship “Dammam.” The group returned in 2019 and announced the seizure of 3 ships, one of them Saudi, in the Red Sea “after “Its entry into territorial waters without prior notice, and without responding to calls from the naval forces.”
But the decisive stage was the outbreak of the Battle of Hodeidah in 2018, which was launched by the Arab coalition to control the port. On June 13, Yemeni government forces and coalition-backed forces participated in the battle to regain control of Hodeidah, which lasted for several days, during which Houthi forces were able to target an Emirati warship.
The battle ended with the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Stockholm between the Yemeni government and the Houthis after international pressure, and the strategic port remained in the control of the Houthis, until they restarted it after the first container ship arrived there from the port of Jeddah in September 2021.
In addition to the port of Hodeidah, the Houthis control the ports of Ras Issa and Saleef, and have naval forces equipped with equipment that includes speedboats, missiles, and sea mines that have been used extensively in the Red Sea, and until 2022 have caused injury to 22 ships belonging to five nationalities: Saudi, Emirati, and Turkish. Greek, and from the Marshall Islands.
Missiles and drones.. What does Al-Houthi have today?
Following the Houthis' control of the capital, Sana'a, and a number of governorates, the group was able to seize the former Yemeni army's weapons and equipment stores, military manufacturing factories and workshops, in addition to a missile arsenal that includes Soviet Scud missiles and tons of weapons and ammunition from the army brigade headquarters.
During the years of confrontation with the Arab coalition in “Decisive Storm,” the military arsenal possessed by the Houthis (the Popular Committees) appeared with different types of missiles: ballistic; Among them are "Toofan" (with a range of 2,000 km) and "Hatem" (with a range of 1,400 km), which are copied from Iranian missile models, in addition to the "Quds" family of winged "cruise" missiles.
In addition to a long series of suicide drones, including “Samad,” “Shehab,” and “Qasef,” equipped with an electro-optical guidance head, capable of striking targets with a range of up to 1,200 kilometers, and they were previously used to strike targets inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as the Houthis announced. Using them to direct attacks on the city of Eilat.
It is worth noting here that reports of United Nations experts indicated an increase in arms smuggling activity from Iran to the Houthis.
On the maritime level, the Houthis possess the “Yemeni Navy”, which includes fast combat boats, explosive drone boats, and frogman forces, in addition to surface-to-sea missile systems, and 12 types of naval mines that appeared in military parades organized by the Houthis, including the “Karrar” families. ", "Asif" and "Saqib", which varied between guided interception mines, floating mines, and magnetic mines that are attached directly to the targeted ships through special naval military units.
Military websites also indicate that the Houthis possess anti-ship cruise missiles, with a range of between 80 and 300 kilometers, including the “Sayyad” and “Sajjil” missiles, in addition to anti-ship ballistic missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometers, including the “Tankeel” anti-ship missile, which It has a range of up to 500 kilometers, and it is a copy of the Iranian “Raad 500” missile.
It was revealed for the first time during a military parade organized by the Houthis in September 2023 in Sanaa, but military experts questioned the reality of the displayed model, noting that it was a life-sized model of the missile.
Some military sources explain that the use of anti-ship ballistic missiles in attacks requires prior intelligence information about the desired targets, provided by drones or ships and naval forces present in the region.
This brings us to the Iranian naval military presence in Bab al-Mandab, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, represented by the weapons and espionage ship “Safez” located north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which was reinforced by the Iranian naval forces with the “Alborz” frigate in the Red Sea and the “Jamran” frigate in the Gulf of Aden, after... A missile strike on Saviz in April 2021 caused severe damage.
The Red Sea Front.. The Houthis in the "Al-Aqsa Flood"
On the twenty-fifth day of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle, corresponding to October 31, the spokesman for the Houthi armed forces, Yahya Saree, announced that they had launched a large batch of ballistic and winged missiles and drones at various targets of the Israeli enemy in the occupied territories.
He pointed out in his first press conference of its kind that this operation is the third carried out “in support of our oppressed brothers in Palestine, and confirms that it will continue to carry out more qualitative strikes with missiles and drones until the Israeli aggression stops.”
This announcement was the first stage of the Yemeni field intervention in the Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood, and was followed by the Houthis’ announcement, through the military spokesman, on November 14, to begin taking “all practical measures to implement the directives issued regarding the appropriate dealing with any Israeli ship in the Red Sea.” .
The Houthi statement included a threat to target all ships that carry the “Israeli” flag, or that are operated by or owned by Israeli companies. The practical application of the threat came 4 days after they announced control of the “Galaxy Leader” ship and taking it to the Yemeni coast, after a helicopter landing operation. On its surface.
The third stage of the Yemeni intervention was their announcement on December 9 in a new military statement, banning the passage of all ships heading to “Israel” of any nationality, and that these ships would become a “legitimate target for the armed forces.” This statement was accompanied by a field escalation in Attacks on ships in the region extending from Bab al-Mandab to the Indian Ocean with missiles and drones, and the United States’ announcement of the formation of a military coalition called “Guardian of Prosperity” to confront Houthi threats to maritime navigation in Bab al-Mandab.
The Yemeni move in the Red Sea raised many analyzes and expectations, most of which saw it as a field initiative and direct involvement in the battle alongside the Shiite militias in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon, while the American accusations went directly to saying that Iran was directly involved in supporting the Houthi move.
Intelligence information
US National Security Council spokeswoman Adrian Watson said in a statement on December 23 that Iranian intelligence is helping the Houthis launch attacks on ships in the Red Sea, confirming in an interview with CNN that “ “Iran has the choice to stop or continue its support, and without Tehran’s support, the Houthis will have difficulty tracking ships in the Red Sea and the Sea of Oman.”
Watson added in her speech that "Iranian support throughout the Gaza crisis enabled the Houthis to launch attacks against Israel and naval targets, although Iran often attributed operational decision-making authority to the Houthis," adding that "the drones and missiles that the Houthis used in the attacks were provided by Iran." Also, as part of its arming of the rebel group since 2015.”
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri responded to these American accusations, in statements to the Iranian Mehr Agency, by denying any connection between the Houthis’ move and an Iranian decision, indicating that the group “acts on its own,” adding that “the resistance possesses the tools of its power and acts based on Its decisions and capabilities.
Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian said in simultaneous statements that Washington had previously asked Iran to advise the Houthis not to target American and Israeli interests, noting that his country had made it clear to the American side that “these groups decide, based on their interests, how to support Gaza,” adding, “ We have not and will not order them to stop these attacks."
However, the Iranian political disavowal of the Houthi naval attacks was accompanied by military threats from General Muhammad Reza Naghdi, Assistant Commander of the Revolutionary Guard for Coordination Affairs, to move the battle to other shipping lanes if “Israel” does not stop its war on the Gaza Strip. Naghdi said in statements to the “Tasnim” agency. Official: “They will soon have to wait for the closure of the Mediterranean, the Strait of Gibraltar and other waterways.”
Fabian Hinz, a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, speculates that Iran may be trying to “transfer its Strait of Hormuz strategy, of having the ability to hold cargo ships through the waterway hostage when political circumstances warrant it, to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. This is “It basically entails the Iranians saying they are able to threaten shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which a large portion of the region’s oil exports pass every day, and now they are doing the same through their proxies in Yemen.”
Source: Al Jazeera