The Axis of Resistance and the Al-Aqsa Flood series (1)... Iran, the idea of ​​the axis and its limits

Soleimani moved the confrontation away from the Iranian depth (Al Jazeera)

The Al Jazeera Net website publishes an integrated file entitled “The Axis of Resistance... The Idea and Its Limits,” which discusses in detail the idea of ​​the axis, the indications for its founding, the history of its formation, and its contexts.

The file also addresses the edges of the axis that revolve in its orbit and are linked to its nucleus, and the spaces in which they operate, and describes the states of polarization and repulsion between its components and their surroundings.

In the file, we examine the relationship of the axis with the Palestinian resistance, which in the Gaza Strip - led by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) - is waging the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle against the Israeli aggression that has been ongoing for 110 days.

The file will be published as a series of episodes. We will begin by talking about Iran as the nucleus of this axis, then we will talk about Syria, the golden link in it. In talking about Hezbollah, we will discuss the attack strategy within the rules of engagement, and in Iraq, the militias affiliated with the axis from its founding until the flood operation, and finally we will examine how it arrived. The Houthis to the sea.

(1) Iran...the idea of ​​the axis and its borders

Tariq Khamis

On January 3, 2020, an American march was flying in the air, carrying a decision to kill the commander of the “Quds Force” of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Qassem Soleimani, and he was accompanied by Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, deputy head of the “Popular Mobilization Forces.”

Soleimani was not an ordinary man in relation to the Iranian project. He was the one who transferred the Quds Force from a device that trained militias and was responsible for Iranian foreign operations, to an organized tool and a complex network of militias that penetrates borders and subjugates geography in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and above all in Lebanon.

Soleimani was able to develop the theory of “forward defense” by moving the confrontation away from the Iranian depth, and thus Iran was able to build an axis that opposes American-Israeli hegemony in the region, and even competes with it in controlling it.

However, the Iranian response to the assassination was measured by “Al-Qattara”. A few days later, specifically on January 8, Iran bombed two American forces’ bases in western and northern Iraq.

This was a coordinated bombing to avoid any exaggerated damage, while analysts close to Iran say that the real response to Soleimani’s killing is to continue his expansionist project in building the militia network and unifying its arenas, and not to expose the achievements that have been accumulated over the years to an uncalculated military adventure.

Iran realizes that it is no match for the United States of America and its allies, but it seeks to expand its influence so that it can gain the necessary equality in international relations.

According to the popular description, she prefers to “boil the frog in cold water instead of putting it in a boiling pot.”

An influential regional state

Iran seeks to be a strong regional state that represents the premier economic, scientific, and technical center in Southwest Asia (including Iran's regional neighborhood in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East regions).

Therefore, starting in 1989, its frantic effort to export the revolution will subside and be replaced by preserving its gains.

That is, working more with the logic of the nation-state. Iran today defines itself as a Persian nation-state with a Twelver Shiite doctrine, and is maneuvering within the squares of the international system to expand its presence by adopting the theory of “asymmetric warfare.”

It is not feasible to accumulate a conventional force from a regular army that is required to confront and defeat the armies of opponents, as this is a process that requires a lot of time, resources and allies, and carries with it great possibilities of loss, especially since the Iranians have in their memory a regular war that lasted for 8 years with Iraq, in which they accumulated a lot of experience. .

All this early and violent experience of the young revolution made it quickly learn that revolutionary slogans are suitable for attracting followers and mobilizing the masses, but they will not always address the huge difference between the balance of power, especially if the project is based on revitalizing a minority group for which the danger of its extinction will be an inherent concern.

Therefore, Iran will later avoid any possibilities of a zero-sum war, and therefore the task of accumulating power will then serve to avoid war, and to achieve goals at the lowest costs and far from its territory, presenting itself as a strong party with which an understanding can be reached at a time when it can harm lightly.

By the way, combining rationality with a touch of rebellion against the international system is a game that the Iranians have mastered. They have a suit for every arena and every context. The most dangerous thing about accumulating deterrence power is that you are deterred by the fear of losing it.

Iran and flood accounts

In more than one official statement, Iran expressed its blessing for the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, which was launched by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) against Israel. The most prominent of these statements was what was stated by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but at the same time he denied the existence of any connection to Tehran. This is what Iranian officials have continued to repeat.

Contrary to what was published by the Wall Street Journal, which stated that Iranian security officials directly helped plan the flood attack, the United States went on to say that it does not have any evidence indicating that Iran is complicit in the attack.

This is what US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken expressed by saying, “Iran and Hamas have a long relationship... Hamas would not have become this way without the support it received for many years from Iran,” but he added, “We have not yet seen evidence that Iran specifically managed this attack.” Or was she behind him?

America has no information to implicate Iran or even an intention to involve it in a regional war. It has enough concerns;

The Chinese challenge is knocking on the doors of global hegemony and is about to be opened to it.

On the other hand, the Iranians have no desire to get involved in a wide and direct war with the major powers, and their eyes are on the American aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, which came sailing in the eastern Mediterranean to impose deterrence, and they are fully aware that they came to deter them, in addition to this. About dozens of American bases spread across our Arab countries, keen to intervene if Iran violates the established rules of engagement.

But what must be realized is that the goal of avoiding war, if it is exaggerated, may become its most important cause, and history tells us that when British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned to his homeland after concluding the “Munich” Treaty with Hitler, and announced the achievement of “peace in our time,” he had already Hitler encouraged his attack.

Iran is aware of this, and therefore it does not want to appear weak, as the next target may be its arm in southern Lebanon and the front of its war. A report by the Israeli Channel 12 on December 23 stated that behind-the-scenes negotiations are being conducted by several countries with the aim of removing the forces of Iran. Hezbollah on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

The most prominent points discussed, according to the Israeli channel’s report, are: pushing Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River, introducing an international force into the Shebaa Farms areas and north of the village of Ghajar, and accepting the appointment of a new president for Lebanon and a new commander of the Lebanese army.

The Iranian axis moved from all its locations in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, according to limited rules of engagement that do not lead to uncalculated escalation.

At the same time, he sent a message about the “unity of the squares” and their simultaneous movement in defense of each other.

These limited steps, especially on the northern Lebanese front and in Yemen, created some feeling that the Palestinian resistance would not be left alone. However, these steps - despite their importance in the absence of others - did not reach the point in which they would deter "Israel" or curb its aggression against the Gaza Strip.

Nasrallah's speech

The speech by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah removed the ambiguity - which was useful - about the party’s position, setting specific rules to reassure everyone - except for the resistance in Gaza - that war is far away.

Thus, the high human cost in the Gaza Strip was not an incentive for the “axis” to develop its method of intervention, as the number of martyrs exceeded 25 thousand.

Thus, Iran turned its calculated intervention into a message box for several parties. On the one hand, it continued to express the limits of its axis and influence and move in harmony, and at the same time it proved to the international system that it is a party that enjoys the rationality of modern states and offers balanced calculations over adventures.

On the other hand, Hezbollah occupied part of the Israeli army on the northern front, evacuated many Israeli settlements in northern occupied Palestine, and besieged Israel in the Red Sea.

The Houthi interventions allowed it to bypass its territorial waters and reach the Indian coast, increasing its ability to deter other opponents.

Thus, it laid out many papers that could be negotiated later, and then sent a message of censure to the resistance in Gaza for being the only one to decide the battle.

The "Al-Aqsa Flood" battle was not carried out by Iran, nor was it in its style, despite the fact that statements a year before the operation had indicated the necessity of an operation of this kind and pledged serious intervention if it took place.

In an interview conducted in August 2022 and published on the Al-Murshid website, the head of the Revolutionary Guard, Hussein Salami, said, “The Palestinians are ready today for ground war, and Israel’s greatest weakness is ground war, and fighting with missiles is not the main point in the conflict, and they They know that the lands must be liberated with ground forces, and the outcome of the battle will be determined when the struggle is on the ground, and the brave, experienced sons of Hezbollah and Palestine will move on the ground in one military formation.”

Path of understanding

Contrary to what is rumored that the Al-Aqsa Flood operation came at an appropriate time for the Iranians, as it disrupted the upcoming process of normalization, it also disrupted some recovery in the process of Iranian-American understanding.

Two months before the flood, it seemed that the Iranians were on the verge of breaking the deadlock that prevailed in the understandings with Washington. The agreement to free the five prisoners and free $6 billion for Iran, which had been frozen in South Korea, represented a new hope for the Iranians in dismantling the economic blockade imposed on them.

During the same period, Iranian oil exports witnessed high production levels, according to Kpler, a provider of oil shipment flow data.

According to the company itself, Iranian exports exceeded 1.5 million barrels per day last May, which is their highest monthly level since 2018, the year in which President Donald Trump canceled the nuclear agreement.

Experts say that this comes within America's desire to avoid rising oil prices ahead of the US elections, but it also indicates a desire to revive understandings with the Iranians.

Recently, Hezbollah agreed to demarcate the maritime borders with “Israel”, which are Palestine’s stolen shares, and under the supervision of the American-Israeli envoy, Amos Hochstein, the demarcation and understanding process is taking place, which was preceded by a verbal escalation.

The party is also experiencing a local environment on the verge of collapse, and it will not risk displacing its incubator in circumstances like these.

Hamas and Iran...the peculiarity of the alliance

The “liberation of Jerusalem” speech formed one of the ideological components of the Iranian revolution and after it the state’s stabilization phase. This position was the basis of Khomeini’s criticism of the Shah’s rule. The position on the Palestine issue is considered a necessary credential for anyone who raises the slogan of resistance in the general conscience of the Arab and Islamic peoples. In addition to that, Israel is also Iran's real regional competitor.

“Israel” presents itself as the guardian of the Gulf states from the Iranian threat, and the advanced base for the West in limiting Iranian influence, while Iran presents itself as the guardian of the flame of resistance and the owner of a serious project in confronting Israeli influence, but nevertheless it avoids a direct clash with it, and prefers to besiege its expansion. And preoccupation with supporting Palestinian factions.

Early and since the Iranian revolution, the relationship between Iran and the Palestinian resistance began through the PLO, and Hamas later built on that.

In 1990, the movement was invited to attend a conference in Tehran to support the first uprising, and in 1991, it opened an office in Tehran, but the actual development in the relationship began after 2006, that is, after the movement’s victory in the elections, and what that meant for Iran, such as Other forces, including the presence and public support for Hamas.

After the outbreak of the revolution in Syria in 2011, the relationship suffered a serious cooling, after Hamas decided to leave Syria and stand by the revolution against the regime, which was supported by Iran.

Iran saw Hamas' position as a departure from the "axis", but it also demonstrated that the movement was not an arm affiliated with the Iranian project, but rather enjoyed equality in dealing with it as an ally with its own interests and calculations.

These years of apathy did not last long. After 2014 and the setback of the Arab revolutions, the relationship between Iran and Hamas returned to its vitality.

With the outbreak of the “Devouring Storm” battle, which the resistance fought in response to the Israeli occupation’s aggression against Gaza, it appeared that the resistance’s capabilities are constantly developing, which means it is entering paths for local manufacturing, without complete dependence on Iranian support, which is evident during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle. " this year.

Hamas sought to restore relations with Iran.

Because it is the only country that extended a supportive hand to it with money, weapons, and expertise, while the siege was imposed on it from various Arab and Islamic countries, especially its neighbors.

Hamas independence

In one of the interviews with Osama Hamdan, a member of the political bureau of Hamas and its representative in Lebanon, he answered when asked about the relationship with Iran: “Yes, we receive support from Iran, and the fault is that others do not provide support... That whoever supports the Palestinians becomes condemned, and whoever accepts support from the Palestinians becomes condemned.” Convicted, this is the last wonder of the world. Convicted is one who does not support the cause.”

However, this support and acceptance did not mean for Hamas a dissolution of the Iranian project and its alliances, as the movement continued to take a distance that would qualify it to take a position in support of the right of peoples to be liberated from tyranny, and at the same time focus on defending its society for which it is responsible without interfering in the conflicts of the region.

This was stated by officials in the movement, as Osama Hamdan said in his article entitled “International Relations of the Hamas Movement”: “The movement has always been keen on the independence of its decisions despite its affiliation to the nation, and it has rejected subordination in any of its political relations, and the movement has always refused to be under the wing of A party or team, regardless of the state of harmony, consensus, and good relations. The movement also refused to build any form of relations on the basis of its political exploitation or its performance in favor of agendas that may conflict with its principles, or with the interests of the nation, or with a general human interest.

As for Khaled Al-Qadoumi, Hamas’ representative in Tehran, he said: “The Iranians have never stipulated any conditions of their own in exchange for supporting Hamas, and Iran knows that if they had stipulated, Hamas would not have accepted that.”

Regarding the position of the Hamas movement within the Iranian defense system and whether it is part of it, the Revolutionary Guard answered the question of the researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, Fatima Al-Sammadi: “Our decision is to defend Hamas, and if the battle with Iran occurs, it is certain that Hezbollah will participate and the Popular Mobilization Forces will participate, as well as supporters.” God and the Zainabiyoun, and it is a defensive strategy that we have built.”

The Guard continues his answer, “As for Hamas, it is enough for it to fight Israel, and it is not required to fight on behalf of Iran if we are attacked. The only battle that Hamas is expected to fight is the war with Israel in the Palestinian arena and to liberate the occupied Palestinian territories, not in any other arena.” There is only one enemy, which is Israel."

In fact, these answers on the part of the Guard and the movement, as much as they confirm the movement’s independence from the Iranian project and place the alliance between them within the framework of the strategic alliance based on the unity of the enemy, they place the movement in a lower degree of importance for the Iranian project, which helps explain the discipline of the movement. Rules of engagement in the Axis’ intervention in the confrontation.

Pressure on Israel

It is true that an open regional battle is a goal that no one seeks, but expanding the clash to the point that pressures Israel, threatens it, and pushes it to curb its aggression, is a matter that can still be achieved, and although that carries a real adventure, this is what distinguishes military confrontations, and it is what the ally pays for. Yes, his ally in times of crisis.

We must remember that Iran provided assistance to Assad with 70,000 fighters, and mobilized thousands in Iraq to confront the “Islamic State” organization. This is the actual meaning of “unity of the battlefields,” as it has two meanings: the real, which we saw in Syria and Iraq, and the symbolic, representative, which we witnessed in The relationship with the resistance in Gaza.

It is useful to know the way Iran thinks, to understand the nature of its project, and to follow the development of its expansion, especially the exceptional role played by the “Quds Force” from the time of its founding to be a body parallel to the army and capable of performing external roles, through the fall of Iraq.

The golden moment that contributed to the expansion of his influence, leading to the exceptional plan of 2011, which represented an opportunity to expand influence in Syria and Yemen and strengthen the relationship with various arenas.

The Quds Force.. How was the axis created?

The emergence of the Revolutionary Guard and the “Quds Force” goes back to the beginning of the Iranian Revolution’s experience, and the mission was primarily to confront internal challenges. The army was not trusted by the revolution due to its connection to the previous era, and the importance of forming a committee for asymmetric wars was raised early, especially after the Kurdistan War and the Iranian War. Iraqi.

By 1989, the Quds Force was the merger of several Iranian organizations, carrying out similar tasks within the framework of reorganizing the armed forces, and Ahmed Vahidi assumed leadership of the Corps during the period between 1989 and 1998.

The idea of ​​establishing a body for external special operations or for training militias and external intervention was not something new to the security traditions of the pre-revolutionary Iranian state. Rather, it was an approach that fell within several trends that the Iranian revolution inherited and developed as a continuation of the traditions of the nation-state since the 1960s, especially support for external militias. Examples of this include: Iran’s support for the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq (1961-1974), participation in the suppression of the Dhofar Revolution in Oman (1972-1979), and others.

Opposition to the presence of foreign powers militarily in the Gulf region constituted an old determinant of the Iranian state, in addition to the development of nuclear and missile programs that began before the revolution. These are all basic determinants of the state in Iran that preceded the Khomeini revolution, and their continuity was maintained after the revolution, as Iranian affairs experts see. .

It is useful to realize this for the battle of continuity that modern nation-states face, regardless of the nature of the rulers’ propaganda and ideology, although this ideology, of course, has its central and important role.

The first major opportunity for the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon was evident in 1982, when officers of the Revolutionary Guards were working hard to establish Hezbollah, and in cooperation with Imad Mughniyeh, they established the Special Security Service, which is the wing of Hezbollah responsible for coordination with the Quds Force.

The device that will carry out many operations against the American embassy and American and French military barracks.

This reflects the Guard's readiness to constantly invest in opportunities and its high readiness to take advantage of chaos.

Cooperation with Washington

Iran severed diplomatic relations with America in 1980, after taking American diplomats in Tehran hostage. However, starting on September 11, the Iranians showed cooperation with the Americans in striking their common enemy, the Taliban.

Ryan Crocker, a senior State Department official, was not surprised to find that Soleimani was flexible in coordinating with them. “You don't go through eight years of brutal war without being somewhat pragmatic,” he said.

According to Dexter Filkins, author of the article “The Shadow General” in the American “New Yorker” magazine, cooperation between the two countries continued during the first phase of the war.

At one point, Iran's chief negotiator handed Crocker a map detailing Taliban troop movements: “Here's our advice: Hit them here first, then hit them here…” “Can I take notes?” Crocker asked, surprised.

“You can keep the map,” the negotiator replied.

This form of coordination reflected Iran's ability to challenge the international system, to come to an understanding with it if interests coincide, and even to talk to the "Great Satan" if necessary.

But the “Great Satan” in January 2002, at the hands of President George W. Bush, placed Iran on an equal footing with what he called the “axis of evil” countries. This was a disappointment to the Iranians, and thus closed the door on the secret communications that witnessed the beginning of the war on Afghanistan.

Soleimani and achieving goals by all means

Qassem Soleimani assumed command of the Corps between 1998 and 2020, and contributed to its qualitative shift. He was seen in Syria, Iraq, and everywhere he needed his presence.

During his reign, the Legion was no longer just an organization for secret operations, but rather made it a popular mobilization force capable of attracting broad, non-religious groups united by Shiite identity or self-interested desire, so that they owed loyalty or interest to the central project in Iran.

The Legion has become a dominant force that manages crises, intervenes in them, and participates in the political process as well. These networks are linked to its charismatic and proactive personality, which succeeded in exploiting opportunities and capabilities and mastered the use of soft and hard forces in their appropriate places, mixed with revolutionary ideological discourse, but accompanied by a pragmatic sense that operates within... Rules of national politics. We must always remember that pragmatism does not mean abandoning principles as is rumored, but rather here it means adhering to principles but with other tools.

Soleimani was able to build a comprehensive structure for the Corps in Afghanistan, Africa, Central Asia, Iraq, Lebanon, Latin America, and the Arabian Peninsula, and established nearly 20 training camps in Iran, in addition to camps in Lebanon, and finally in Sudan, and created a logistical network specialized in managing secret weapons shipments at the international level. .

According to the author of the “Shadow General” article, “The Legion has become an organization of extraordinary reach, with branches focusing on intelligence, finance, politics, sabotage, and special operations.

With a base in the former US Embassy compound in Tehran, the force has between ten and twenty thousand members, divided between fighters and those who train and supervise foreign assets.

Iraq... when it broke the western gate of Iran

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Iranians learned the two most important lessons in their national security theory: 1- The necessary awareness of the nature of the future and its irregular warfare.

2- The urgent desire for a weak Iraq to be a gateway to expansion in the region.

This is something that is agreed upon among the various Iranian political factions.

For Iran, the war with Iraq was the beginning of a three-decade project to build a Persian Shiite zone of influence extending across Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean, challenging Western influence and its Arab regimes, and any Sunni Arab component that is on its way to being formed or in the process of assuming power.

On March 19, 2003, American cruise missiles were irreversibly destroying the gate to Iraq, the gate whose breaking would later lead to the start of the era of Iranian expansion.

In three weeks, the regime that had exhausted Iran in the eight-year war was over.

كان الإيرانيون يراقبون ذلك بقلق، ولكي يتجنبوا الموجة العالية من الغضب الأميركي، قدموا في 4 مايو/أيار2003 مذكرة وخارطة طريق للأميركان، وذلك من خلال السفير السويسري تيم غولدمان في طهران، وافقت إيران فيها على الشفافية الكاملة فيما يخص برنامجها النووي، وعلى وقف دعمها لحماس واتخاذ إجراءات تؤدي إلى نزع سلاح حزب الله.

وفي المقابل أراد الإيرانيون أن تتوقف الولايات المتحدة عن محاولة تغيير نظامهم السياسي، وتسليم أعضاء من "منظمة مجاهدي خلق الإيرانية"، والاعتراف بـ"المصالح الأمنية المشروعة لإيران في المنطقة".

وأرادوا بيانا يفيد بأن إيران ليست جزءا من "محور الشر"، وفق ما أفاد به السفير في حوار مع ديفيد كريست، مؤلف كتاب "حرب الشفق".

ولا ندري هل كانت إيران جدية في هذه المبادرة أم أنها أسلوب دبلوماسي للمشاغلة وإشعار القوى الكبرى بأنه يمكن التفاهم معها.

أرسلت أمريكا كروكر إلى بغداد لتنظيم حكومة ناشئة تسمى "مجلس الحكم العراقي". وفي الوقت الذي انطلقت فيه المقاومة العراقية التي تركزت في المناطق السنية، ركز الجيش الأميركي جل اهتمامه على مكافحة التمرد السني، وتجنب استفزاز إيران ومليشياتها قدر المستطاع.

كان السياسيون العراقيون الذين قبلوا العمل مع الاحتلال يتشاورون على الدوام مع سليماني، واتفق الرجلان، كروكر وسليماني، بطريقة غير مباشرة، على المرشحين الشيعة المحتملين، يشير كروكر إلى أن "تشكيل مجلس الحكم كان في جوهره مفاوضات بين طهران وواشنطن".

اجتثاث البعث

لقد أرادت إيران انتصار أميركا على العراق، لكنها لم ترده انتصارا يشكل خطرا عليها، ويضيع منها فرصة النفوذ في الدولة المجاورة. فانطلاقا من عام 2004، كانت الألغام الإيرانية و"جيش المهدي" -المليشيات الشيعية التابعة لمقتدى الصدر- يوقعان خسائر في الأميركان، على خلاف "لواء بدر" الذي تفرغ لحملة انتقامية ضد البعثيين.

وقد شكلت هاتان السياستان جوهر التدخل الإيراني: 1- اجتثاث البعث والوجود السني معه، الذي سيعبر عنه لاحقا بقانون "اجتثاث البعث" في فترة المالكي وسيجري توسيعه ليشمل كل تنافس محتمل من السنة، و2- التفاهم مع الأمريكان في أحيان، وإيقاع الأذى فيهم في أحايين أخرى.

وفي أوائل عام 2008، كان ديفيد بترايوس، قائد القوات الأميركية، يستمع إلى رسالة سليماني التي كان نصها: "عزيزي الجنرال بترايوس، يجب أن تعلم أنني، قاسم سليماني، أتحكم في سياسة إيران فيما يتعلق بالعراق ولبنان وغزة وأفغانستان".

وبالفعل فإن السفير في بغداد هو عضو في فيلق القدس، والشخص الذي سيحل محله هو عضو في فيلق القدس أيضا.

وبحلول عام 2011، كانت إيران قد أحكمت سيطرتها على العراق، وبنت فيه قوة شاملة سياسيا وعسكريا تتبع لها، أمام أنظار ما يقارب 200 ألف جندي أميركي.

ومع أن النظام الحاكم في إيران حاول باستمرار أن يبدي مرونة، وأحيانا توافقا، مع النظام الدولي، كما في حرب الخليج الثانية (1990-1991) وحربي أفغانستان (2001) والعراق (2003)، فقد بقي الملف النووي ودعم المقاومة والموقف من "إسرائيل" محل نزاع.

هذا إضافة إلى رغبة الأميركان في الحد من التوسع الإيراني وليس القضاء عليه، فالخطر الإيراني ضامن لاستمرار حاجة الخليج إلى أميركا.

وبدءًا من عام 2007، وُضع الحرس الثوري وفيلق القدس على قوائم الإرهاب، وبقيت العلاقة مع أميركا تتفاوت بحسب سكان البيت الأبيض، بين العقوبات الاقتصادية والاحتواء بالتفاهمات.

وفي خضم كل ذلك، دللت إيران وأثبتت للنظام الدولي أنها طرف إقليمي قوي ومخيف، ولكن في الوقت نفسه يمكن التفاهم معه.

الفرص مجددا

لم تكن إيران لتسمح للجسر الواصل بينها وبين حزب الله بالسقوط، حيث كان سليماني يشرف بنفسه على إدارة معركة إنقاذ نظام بشار الأسد. وقد شكلت معركة "القصير" (المدينة التي تعد مدخلا إلى البقاع؛ معقل حزب الله)، أبرز بداية لهذا التدخل.

ومع حلول مايو/أيار 2014، وصل "الجيش الشعبي" المكون من المليشيات المدعومة إيرانيا، بقوام سبعين ألف مقاتل، إلى سوريا، وذلك بحسب ما صرح به مسؤول في الحرس الثوري.

وجدت إيران في سقوط نظام الأسد تهديدا إستراتيجيا لمشروعها، وضربا لخط إمداد حزب الله؛ حربتها المتقدمة في تهديد "إسرائيل".

قاتل الإيرانيون وحلفاؤهم سنوات طويلة لمنع سقوط نظام الأسد، تماما مثلما تحركوا بتأسيس الحشد الشعبي في العراق لمنع سقوط النظام العراقي.

ولقد شكل الانهيار السريع للجيش العراقي في الموصل أمام مقاتلي تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في 10 يونيو/حزيران 2014، مصدر خطر حقيقي على السيطرة الشيعية في العراق، فأصدر السيستاني المرجع الشيعي الأعلى فتوى "الجهاد الكفائي"، وعلى إثرها تشكلت قوات الحشد الشعبي.

وفي اليمن تمكن الحوثيون، الذين تلقوا تدريبا وتسليحا إيرانيا، من السيطرة على العاصمة صنعاء. وفي نهايات عام 2014، سعت إيران إلى تطوير شبكة نفوذها وتهديد العمق السعودي الجنوبي والتمركز في الممرات المائية في الخليج.

يعطي هذا الحجم من الذهاب في الخيارات العسكرية والدفاع عن حدود النفوذ انطباعا قويا عن جدية إيران في بناء شبكة نفوذها في المنطقة، وهي لا تتردد في أن تتدخل بكل قوتها حين يتعلق الموضوع بمصلحة مشروعها، وتقدير حجم التدخل يتعلق بحجم المصلحة المترتبة على إنقاذ الحليف وطبيعة انتمائه العقدي وطبيعة الخصم الذي يواجهه، فلا يمكن فصل تمددها السياسي عن مكونها الشيعي، وقدرتها على تحفيز الشعور بالخطر عند الأقلية الشيعية العربية وربط مصالحهم بمصلحة مشروعها.

لقد شكل "التشيع" وسيلة إيران في التمدد، لكنه أيضا هدف من أهدافها، وفي الواقع، سيبقى سوء التفاهم قائما في وعينا السياسي ما دمنا نرث أدوات تحليلية علمانية لا تنظر إلى العقائد إلا بوصفها أدوات تعمل في خدمة المصالح العقلانية القومية، ولكن ثمة درجة من التداخل لا يعود معها بالإمكان التمييز بين ما هو مصلحي وما هو ديني على أنها حقول منفصلة، فالعقيدة كفيلة بترتيب المصالح، والمصالح لا يمكن البناء عليها إلا بأخذ العقيدة التي أمدتها بمشروعيتها بالاعتبار.

بهذا يمكن فهم المكون الفارسي للدولة الإيرانية؛ المكون الذي يملي على الدولة ركائزه ونظرته للأمن، كما يورث ثقافته. فليس غريبا أن يبدأ تمجيد ذكرى قورش في عهد أحمدي نجاد، المعروف بتمسكه بالمكون الشيعي للسياسة. ففي المحصلة، تستثمر إيران مثل أي دولة قومية كل مصادرها الذاتية لتجعل منها عناصر قوة، ثم لا يعود ممكنا بعدها التمييز بين الأدوات والأهداف عندما تنتظم في وجهة واحدة.

هل تشارك إيران في الطوفان؟

يمكن القول إن ثمة شراكة إستراتيجية تجمع المحور الإيراني بحماس، بل هي جزء منه، بالمعنى السياسي، لكنها تفترق معه في المكون العقدي، وتستقل عنه في القرار السياسي والعسكري، وهو ما كشفت عنه معركة "طوفان الأقصى"، ولا تتفق معه في مشاريعه في المنطقة، وهو ما كشفت عنه لحظة الخروج من سوريا بمعزل عن شكل التصريحات المبالغ فيها التي صدرت لاحقا.

All of this makes Hamas occupy a lower rank within the slogan of “unity of the arenas,” compared to the other arenas: Syria and Lebanon, as these are projects that are organically, ideologically, and interests-related to the Iranian project, regardless of their degrees of independence and ability to move and take initiative.

The event is still taking place, and it is not possible to say with certainty how it will develop, but in its current form it is sufficient to imagine the form and nature of the alliance.

What is important to realize is that the alliance between Hamas and Iran comes in the absence of any other Arab or Muslim support in the military and political issue. On the contrary, many Arab regimes conspire against the Palestinian resistance and hope to eliminate it.

Once again, the Iranian project is expanding in every area in which it can expand, exploiting and developing opportunities.

Source: Al Jazeera