For more than six years, negotiations have been continuing between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over the Renaissance Dam, without any progress on the contentious issues.

The Renaissance Dam, which Addis Ababa began building on the Blue Nile in 2011, will, upon its completion, become the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, but this vital project has sparked sharp differences between Ethiopia and both Sudan and Egypt, with which they share the Nile waters.

During those years, Cairo accuses Addis Ababa of intransigence, prevarication and diminishing the chances of reaching an agreement. On the other hand, Ethiopia rejects the Egyptian accusations, and stresses that it deals with flexibility and cooperation in negotiations, and that it is committed to not harm the downstream countries.

Ethiopia has practically started the preliminary steps to start filling Al-Nahda Dam, where forests have been removed and trees uprooted around the Al-Nahda Dam area, in which the lake will be filled on an area of ​​one thousand hectares, and the removal process is taking place with the participation of 20,000 workers and experts, at the dam site in the Ethiopian province of Beni Shankul, which borders Sudan.

According to sources involved in the negotiations, the points of contention are concentrated between the three countries in the process of operating and filling the dam, and Cairo adheres to its share of the Nile water, or 55.5 billion cubic meters, according to the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan.

Cairo also demands Addis Ababa to recognize the three previous agreements for the distribution of water quotas in 1902, 1929 and 1959, which the latter rejects, because it was not a party to those agreements.

With the failure of all rounds of negotiations over the past years, Ethiopia says it is proceeding with its plan to fill the Renaissance Dam by next July, saying that "there is no need to notify Sudan and Egypt of this."

With Ethiopia completing the construction of the Renaissance Dam and approaching the beginning of filling the dam, how did Addis Ababa succeed in overcoming historical agreements and turning the dream of the dam into reality? Did Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi help her achieve this ?, Al-Jazeera Net dived in the past to provide information about the Blue Nile and the historical agreements of water for the Nile, before the Nile Basin countries revolt against it, and ended with Sisi's recognition of the Renaissance Dam in 2015.

Blue Nile The Blue
Nile coming from Ethiopia contributes the largest part of the Nile water coming to Egypt and Sudan, while the White Nile contributes to the remaining part, but this percentage remains variable, as it is subject to the maximum and minimum rainy seasons throughout the year.

According to experts, the annual flow rate of the White Nile before reaching Khartoum is 29.6 billion cubic meters per year, while the flow rate of the Blue Nile is 49.7 billion cubic meters per year, and after the two rivers meet in Khartoum, the united Nile River reaches Aswan, the southernmost part of Egypt, with a flow rate It is 84 billion cubic meters per year, or 90 billion if we add to it the amount of evaporation.

Experts added to the island that the flow of the White Nile remains almost constant during the four seasons, and thus the contribution of the Blue Nile becomes 90% and the White Nile 5% at the peak, while it becomes 70% for the first and 30% for the second at lower cases, according to FAO.

It should be noted that most of the riparian countries in the basin - except Sudan and Egypt - have their need for water and an increase in the abundance of fresh lakes and rivers and the large amount of rainfall in them, while Sudan depends 77% and Egypt 97% on the waters of the Nile River.

Historical agreements
It is noted in the Rome Agreement signed on April 15, 1891 between Britain and Italy that occupied Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the Addis Ababa Agreement signed on May 15, 1902 between Britain and Ethiopia.

Likewise, the London Agreement signed on December 13, 1906 between Britain, France and Italy, and the Rome Agreement of 1925, all stipulated not to prejudice the historical rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile River and not to establish projects in those countries that would cause disruption in the waters of the Nile or Reducing the amount of water that flows in Egyptian lands.

The reason for that was not the special love that these countries had for Egypt, but rather to curb the ambitions of the colonial states in exchange for each other so that Egypt does not disappear and fall victim under the weight of colonial arrogance, especially since the Nile was and is the mainstay of its existence.

The agreement of 1929 between Egypt and Britain - which was acting on behalf of Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania - came in harmony with all previous agreements, as it stipulated that no irrigation, hydroelectric works or any other measures should be undertaken on the Nile and its branches or on lakes that are It stems from it, whether in Sudan or in countries under British administration that would reduce the amount of water that reaches Egypt, or amend its arrival date or reduce its level in any way that would harm Egyptian interests, as it stipulates Egypt's natural and historical right to the waters of the Nile.

For the first time, the November 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan set the amount of water at 55.5 billion cubic meters annually for Egypt and 18.5 billion for Sudan.

The basin rebellion
and years later, the indications of the Nile Basin countries' rejection of some provisions of the agreement began in May 2009, when a ministerial meeting of the Nile Basin countries was held in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo to discuss the legal and institutional framework for the Nile waters, and Egypt refused to sign the agreement without an explicit provision preserving Its historical rights in the waters of the Nile.

In July of the same year, an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of the Nile Basin countries was held in Alexandria. At the beginning of the sessions, warnings were issued to exclude the estuary countries (Egypt and Sudan) from signing the agreement, and then given a period of 6 months for the two countries.

The Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Ambassador Hossam Zaki, warned of "the danger of rushing behind false allegations, which are unfounded, spreading invisible hands in some upstream countries that are falsely called Egypt's opposition to the efforts and development projects in these countries," noting that Egypt has been and will remain the main supporter and big sister For the Nile Basin countries.

Zaki stressed that what Egypt is calling for is adherence to the principle of consultation and prior notification in the case of establishing any water installations in order to ensure that its national interests are not harmed, which is stipulated in international law.

On March 1, 2011, Burundi signed the Nile Water Sharing Agreement, which means stripping Egypt of many of its concessions in river water, the most prominent of which is the right of veto to prevent any project from being built on the river outside its territory.

Daniel Mepoma, regional spokesperson for the Nile Basin Initiative in Entebbe, announced that after Burundi's signature, the agreement could have entered into force, stressing that, under applicable international law, six states must have signed the agreement.

Sisi abdicated,
and experts believe that the Egyptian position remained strong despite the agreement of the basin countries, until the turning point came with the signing of the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi in 2015 on the principles agreement with the leaders of Ethiopia and Sudan, in which Egypt formally recognized for the first time Ethiopia's right to build the Renaissance Dam, without The agreement obliges Ethiopia to maintain Egypt's share of the Nile's waters.

The kiss of life that Sisi granted to the Renaissance Dam was not hidden or surprising to the Egyptian regime, as government sources said that many official authorities submitted reports to Sisi before the signing of the agreement stating that signing it would weaken Egypt's position, which was asking the international authorities at the time not to finance the dam until after reaching To an agreement on how to fill it, as well as after verifying technical details regarding the security of the dam's body, the nature of the environmental consequences resulting from it, and its impact on the course of the river and the quality of water in it.

The statements, which were reported by Mada Masr on September 26, 2019, said it was a previous government source who had participated in the consultations that preceded Egypt's decision to sign the Principles Agreement.

The government source also confirmed that the President's National Security Adviser, Faiza Abul-Naga, and former intelligence professionals and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Irrigation unanimously agreed that signing the agreement represents an Egyptian declaration of agreeing to Ethiopia building the dam without any guarantees or obligations.

However, Sisi decided that he would sign the agreement, and he told his aides that he would have the ability to make a significant change in the Ethiopian position by "using his personal influence on Ethiopian officials, and even on Ethiopian public opinion" according to the same source.

The website quoted another government source that asking the donor countries and countries not to provide financial and technical support to Ethiopia was the main line that Egyptian diplomacy has worked on since the beginning of Ethiopia's move to build the dam in the recent years of Mubarak’s rule, depending on what international law stipulates that the riparian states of water Rivers cannot undertake water projects that affect the watercourse and the quotas of countries without prior agreement.

However, the demand not to support Ethiopia in the construction of the dam ceased its logic by signing the Agreement of Principles, which represented an official Egyptian recognition of Ethiopia's right to build the dam, regardless of the document not containing clear texts guaranteeing not to proceed with construction of the dam before the agreement, which was previously warned by aides Sisi from his occurrence.