Russia is trying at this stage to continue its political and security understandings with the main parties involved in the Syrian conflict at different levels and patterns. In this context, however, the main problem is the entanglement and contradiction of the interests of those parties in a manner that imposes limited options on them, does not allow them a broad margin of movement, and sometimes leads to a strained relationship with these parties, It is currently in its relations with Israel because of its accusation of the latter responsible for the downing of the Russian plane "Iliosn 20" on 17 September 2018.

In light of this, it can be said that the new ideas that Russia deliberately revealed to look at the positions of the forces concerned and to reach a trade-off between ending Iran's influence in Syria in exchange for easing the US sanctions imposed on it face several obstacles that do not seem easy, And the consequences of those sanctions.

Different Considerations:

Iran will not easily accept ending or even curtailing its influence in Syria in exchange for easing the US sanctions imposed on it, for several reasons, as it will not relinquish its presence in Syria, especially since it drained unlimited financial and human resources even before the outbreak of the conflict in Syria in 2011. To consolidate this presence and put obstacles to the efforts being made to eliminate or contain it.

The swap also means a serious blow to its allies, especially the Syrian regime and Hezbollah, as Iran is the main source of financial and military support, which means that ending its presence in Syria will lead to the cessation of this support and thus weaken their military capabilities in the face of the parties hostile to them.

Moreover, this option will have direct implications for the sectarian militias that Iran has created and trained, not only to help the Syrian regime confront its opponents but also to strengthen Iran's efforts to establish its military influence on the ground. Of course, not resolving the possible paths of the roles that these militias can play in the next stage undermines the possibility of Iran accepting such a swap, considering that it will decide the fate of these militias before they discuss the options for their presence in Syria.

No new deals

Iran will not accept any new deals with the US administration at this stage, as it may prefer to wait to study this option until conditions are developed that may be more in line with its interests.

In other words, Iran remains determined to defy US sanctions, and believes that it has mechanisms to help it deal with these sanctions, despite its strong domestic repercussions, which could prompt it to postpone the option of negotiating or reaching deals with the US administration. Will be able to strengthen its negotiating position to make the least concessions to Washington.

What is remarkable is that some of the recent steps taken by the US administration in the post-implementation phase of the second package of sanctions, on November 5, directed what could be called "wrong signals" to Iran, which, for example, States of US sanctions on its oil imports from Iran temporarily weaken the ability of the US administration to achieve its goal of zeroing Iranian oil exports, which will push it to hold on to its positions at least in the near term, and not to make concessions or accept such deals.

Continuing doubts:

Iran is still skeptical of reaching an agreement with the current US administration, which sees its withdrawal from this agreement as a strong possibility, similar to its position on the current nuclear deal. This was expressed by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, on November 22 last, that «Iran does not see the need for new talks with the United States without guarantees that no reference to any agreement reached», referring to the withdrawal of US President Donald Trump signed on Final communiqué of the G-7 Summit held in Canada on 9 June 2018.

What is striking is that these Iranian suspicions also extend to Russia. Despite the close cooperation between the two sides, both in the nuclear issue and the Syrian, Iran is now expressing clear concern about the policy adopted by Moscow in Syria, especially after the change of balance of military forces in favor of the Syrian regime.

In the vision of Tehran, after strengthening the position of the Syrian regime, Moscow's bet on the Iranian military presence in Syria declined, as there was no longer a need for the survival of the bulk of the forces and militias of Iran as long as the Syrian regime managed to recover a large area of ​​Syrian territory in parallel with the decline of capacity Forces opposing him to overthrow him or threaten his survival in power.

In this regard, Iran relies on Russia's continuing understandings with the United States and Israel, and believes that its main objective is not only to limit Iran's influence on the ground, but of course, but to devote Russia's influence on military, political, economic and even social levels Also, as the main party that controls the reins of things inside Syria.

American Rejection:

Nor does the US administration appear willing to accept such a deal, for reasons of Washington's interests and calculations. Although Iran's presence in Syria is of particular interest to the latter, it is not the only sticking point between the two parties, and even its importance may be reduced if compared to other priority files, such as the nuclear and missile programs. That Iran is trying to circumvent the current nuclear agreement, and can develop a secret military side of its nuclear program. Iran's threats to target its military bases with ballistic missiles, most recently the threats of Revolutionary Guards chief Mohammad Ali Jafari on Nov. 22.

Hence, Washington will probably not accept a partial deal with Iran, especially as it believes that continuing the current policy of raising sanctions and continuing pressure on Iran could allow for greater gains at both the nuclear and regional levels.

In light of this, it can be said that the new Russian ideas do not seem to absorb the new data imposed by the escalating tension between the United States and Iran, which is open on more than one course during the next phase.

Iran remains skeptical about the possibility of reaching an agreement with the current US administration, which believes that its withdrawal from this agreement is a possibility as strongly as its position on the current nuclear agreement.