Frantic politics .. Why Saudi Arabia indulge in the political escalation against Morocco?

Before Al-Arabiya decided to broadcast its short and surprising report on the Western Sahara issue, on February 1, any new political affairs observer could see that water between Morocco and Saudi Arabia had not been going well in recent months , Even without Riyadh deciding to embark on a new reckless political adventure with Morocco from those hasty adventures that have become a hallmark of Saudi foreign policy in recent months, bearing the fingerprints of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

For Rabat, the Saudi state-owned Al-Arabiya channel was not merely a violation of the supposedly friendly relations between the two Arab kingdoms, but it represented the most prominent and bolder crossing of Riyadh for the most important red lines of Moroccan foreign policy; considering the Sahara as part of Morocco; The Saudi report was considered a "political stab in the back", especially since Riyadh has always been a historical supporter of the Moroccan novel about the latter's eligibility in the Sahara, especially in the context of the unresolved relationship between the Polisario Front, which leads the rebellion against Morocco in the Sahara, Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia's two most important political opponents in the region.

Otherwise, the Saudi strike would not have come at a worse time than that for Rabat, with John Bolton in Washington as an American national security adviser, who the Moroccan government regards as sympathetic to the Polisario movement, The strength of its security alliance with Washington, which prompted it to ease its position at the time and to enter into a round of negotiations with the Polisario, Algeria and Mauritania began in December 2018.

Al-Arabiya did not only present a historical account against the Moroccan novel about the Sahara by adopting the novel "Independence" in return for Morocco's "autonomy" proposal, but it started its report by separating the Sahara from Morocco geographically. When the report pointed out that Rabat penetrated the Sahara after wars with Mauritania after the withdrawal of the Spanish in the late seventies, referring to the "Polisario" as the United Nations "legitimate representative" of the Saharawi people, in contradiction to the terms used by the Saudi media use And the Polisario Front as the Polisario separatists. It also contradicted the official Gulf position in support of Morocco, which was expressed on more than one occasion, most recently during the Gulf-Morocco Summit in April 2016.

The Saudi media adventure, then, reflected Riyadh's apparent dissatisfaction with its Atlantic ally. The report, which angered the Moroccans, was only the clearest sentence that broke 20 months of silent tension between the two countries, which apparently began with the Gulf crisis and Rabat's refusal to bow to Saudi pressure The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has joined the Qatar District Club and its adherence to the policy of positive neutrality in the crisis, a position Riyadh responded to in several practices considered by the Moroccans a clear insult and violation of relations between the two countries, most notably the Saudis support the US file for the organization of the 2026 World Cup at the expense of The Moroccan file and their influence on six other Arab countries to take the same position, a position not even taken the most prominent regional rivals of Rabat in Algeria and Iran, the first voted for the Moroccan file while the second abstained from voting.

On the other hand, Morocco did not stand idly by in the face of Saudi intransigence. King Mohammed VI refused to receive Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Rabat during his last tour of North African countries at the end of December. The scandal was the result of a series of escalating positions in Morocco, most notably the Rabat Declaration in February suspending its participation in the presidential elections in Morocco. The war of Yemen, a withdrawal drew a new blow To the credibility of the Saudi alliance in Yemen, and at the same time raised many questions about whether the friendly relations between Morocco and Saudi Arabia, which succeeded in the last decade to overcome the obstacles of geography vast_ will be able to withstand the successive crises that have swept in recent months, The slope until the collapse is entirely possible.

The snow of geography

Napoleon Bonaparte, the famous Emperor of France, believes that the understanding of state policies and relations is always an understanding of geography. Geography here does not mean abstract topographical formations, borders or even climate, but the consequences for political behavior of States. Is clearly applicable to the relations between the GCC countries - primarily Saudi Arabia - and Morocco, although the two spots are theoretically one political space in the Middle East and North Africa; geography has always placed strong restrictions on the development of relations between the two parties. Simple and simple Dah that this political dilemma summarizes the semi-permanent: While the average distance between the Moroccan capital "Rabat" between Riyadh and more than four thousand miles, the distance between Rabat and Paris about 1300 miles only.

As a result, the linguistic, cultural and religious communities were not sufficient to establish early and solid relations between the Gulf region - in the heart of which Saudi Arabia - as a political entity, and between the Maghreb region as an independent entity. Therefore, the two blocs, The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union. While the Gulf countries have historically chosen to link their economies to each other and with great powers, led by the United States and Britain, the Moroccan economy has been more integrated with the economies of the South Europe, l France and Italy, the two former colonial powers of North Africa, as well as Spain, which were subsequently strengthened by successive waves of migration.

Reflecting this geopolitical distance, it was not surprising that the entire Maghreb region gave only 3 % of its exports to the GCC countries to account for only 2.5% of the Gulf's imports. Despite this political and economic upheaval, Saudi Arabia and Morocco in particular maintained relatively warm relations, and this warmth was restored primarily to the religious ties between the two ruling families, which date back to the pre-official state of Saudi Arabia in the early 1930s. With the aspiration of the "Al-Saud" religious leadership to impose their guardianship on the two, they sought to establish relations with the Moroccan ruling family, which extends to the upper family, that extends to the Hassan and Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, ties have been historically supported proportions and Between the two families as well.

The geographical dimension did not stand in the way of some of the essential gestures of the state of harmony between Morocco and Saudi Arabia. The most prominent signs emerged during the second Gulf War after the Iraqi regime of Saddam invaded Kuwait

Reuters

Religious legitimacy was therefore the first moral bond between Rabat and Riyadh, a link that gained momentum after North Africa's independence from colonialism in the 1950s, as Morocco was the only country to retain its monarchy in the Maghreb, In the rest of the countries (Egypt, Libya and Algeria in particular), the republics were "revolutionary" - as described at the time - Saudi Arabia, in particular, did not look at them satisfactorily, which made Rabat a virtual ally of the Gulf monarchies. Virtual Association to be forwarded P.

However, that geographical dimension did not stop the fundamental gestures of the state of compatibility between the two countries, and emerged the most important signals during the second Gulf War after the Iraqi regime of Saddam invaded Kuwait, where Morocco then sent 1200 soldiers to participate in the protection of Saudi Arabia, But soon emerged the fragility of this convergence with the emergence of mass demonstrations in support of Iraq in Morocco following the American intervention, which prompted the then Moroccan King, "Hassan II" to express solidarity with Iraqi civilians, and reduce its commitment to He supported the Gulf-American alliance.

The fragile political ties between Rabat and Riyadh were reinforced by limited economic investment in the second half of the 1990s, thanks to the opening policy adopted by Hassan II, where many Saudi princes and influential people moved to acquire properties and palaces in Morocco, Between the two countries has so far been more based on personal ties and ties of relations between the two ruling families, rather than on a deep structural vision of Saudi-Moroccan relations.

(4) Things began to change significantly starting in 2005 with the rise of "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad" to the presidency in Iran, a rise that was linked to the intensification of Tehran's missionary activities in Morocco and in the depth of the Moroccan strategy in West Africa, especially Senegal, Guinea, Nigeria, Mali, Which has seen a remarkable growth of the Shiite missionary movement, which eventually prompted Morocco to accuse Iran publicly of using its embassy in Rabat to "destabilize Morocco and spread the Shiite doctrine" before Morocco decided to launch a strong campaign against schools and organizations supported by Iran in the Kingdom of Morocco, Ended with a diplomatic break Yen Rabat and Tehran in 2009; following the famous Bahrain crisis and solidarity of Morocco with the Gulf emirate after Iranian officials remarks as «the fourteenth province of Iran».

The relations between Morocco and Iran were tense. [5] However, tension is due to the era of the "Islamic revolution" that overthrew the Shah of Iran, who had a personal relationship with King Hassan II, prompting Morocco to grant political asylum to the Shah after the revolution and Relations with the new Iranian regime, in response to Tehran's support for the interests of so-called "revolutionary separatists" in the desert, pushing Morocco to stand in the ranks of Iraq during the eight-year war. However, those strained relations between Rabat and Tehran did not translate into institutional relations between Morocco and the Arab Gulf states hostile to Iran until the end of the last decade. When Rabat decided to sever its relations with Iran again and engage in its own war on Iranian influence in the Maghreb and its African depth,

At the same time, as indicated by a US diplomatic cable dating back to 2010, Morocco's confrontation with Iran had a dual goal. At the domestic level, the shrinking of the Shiite organizations and the potential threat to the official Sunni identity of the kingdom and thus strengthened the credentials of King "Mohammed VI" In terms of geopolitics, Morocco's anti-Shiite initiatives paved the way for closer ties with Saudi Arabia, which was prepared to reward Rabat for its firm policy towards Tehran with economic aid and subsidized oil. The two kingdoms appeared determined to translate Joint Atrama with Iran to an effective political relationship for the first time in history.

Club Kings

In this atmosphere erupted the uprisings of the Arab Spring mocking the historic rulers of North African countries, foremost of which is Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and Saudi Arabia long before heading the club of counter-revolutions, taking the initiative to lead the reaction against what the ruling ruling regimes considered a popular attack And an ideology on existing systems of the region.

According to this logic, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and specifically the Arab Counterrevolutionary Club, chose to respond to new developments by entering into a broad reorganization process that included the adoption of more assertive, independent and more interventionist security policies, Among others, and finally by seeking to expand its membership by introducing new members who share the same political values ​​and security concerns of the GCC countries. In early 2011, the Council issued a rare invitation to Jordan and Morocco to join it, without clarifying whether this invitation means giving the two countries Or is it just a flexible political expansion that does not give the invited States the privileges of full membership in the club of rich countries.

For the GCC countries, and for Saudi Arabia in particular, the Gulf's properties faced similar threats to the formation of the GCC in the early 1980s. The Arab Spring led to a power vacuum with some strong Middle Eastern countries led by Egypt to retreat. At a time when the United States was looking to reduce its presence in the region, giving Iran an unprecedented opportunity to extend its influence and influence at a time when the Gulf was still suffering from its initial problem, the imbalance between its financial strength and its military power, For powers Humanity in the first place.

These reasons have prompted many to explain Morocco's and Jordan's invitation to join the GCC as an attempt to mobilize militarily to counter the threat of a possible uprising that could hit the Gulf coastline. This plan was consistent with the long-term security vision of the Gulf monarchies that have always tended to use Sunni insurgents outside their borders to help. Its armies and security units _ to avoid the political risks of expanding the recruitment of its fighters, and the consequent establishment of national armies that could rival the ruling families in power, making Morocco - home to more than 30 million people - a potential source of the Sunni workforce A trainer for Saudi Arabia and its allies.

The most obvious thing about inviting Morocco and Jordan specifically to join the Gulf Club is that it came as an attempt to establish an umbrella club for the royal regimes in the region to prevent the arrival of the mass disturbances that hit the Arab military republics. Jordan and Morocco are the only two monarchies in the Arab region outside The Gulf initiative has been widely welcomed by Jordan, which has a common border with Saudi Arabia, which has some kind of close economic ties with the Gulf countries on the level of trade and labor movement. Despite Morocco's need for Gulf financial assistance to face potential local unrest, create more jobs, face a surge in military spending in Algeria and maintain a fragile balance of power in the Maghreb, especially in light of Algeria's long and sustained support for the FMLN. "Polisario" as a strategy is almost unchanged.

This is mainly due to the personal position of the current Moroccan King Mohammed VI, who has less strong personal ties with the Gulf states than his father Hassan II, in addition to his intention to reduce involvement in Arab issues in favor of further African conflict. , As well as the ambition of the establishment of the Club of the Arab Kingdoms quickly proved its limitations on the practical level, both the geographical diversity and vast distances as we mentioned, or the historical difference between the old property established in Morocco and the relatively modern Gulf kingdoms, and there is a clear difference in the pattern Economic relations between the Gulf states, which have most of their revenues from oil and have strong investment capabilities, and between Morocco, whose GDP depends mainly on taxes, and the difference in the constitutional and institutional structures that show greater maturity in Morocco compared to the Gulf countries, even in the religious model; Morocco is a more moderate religious reading compared to the traditional religious choices of Saudi Arabia.

Morocco's security authorities have not been subjected to popular protests in any form of repression or violence, which is unusual for Arab countries in general

Reuters

Even in the political system, the common adoption of the monarchy does not mean that the kings in Morocco and Saudi Arabia rule their country in the same way. While the Saudi king is chiefly dependent on a ruling family of tens of thousands of princes who monopolize senior positions and key bureaucratic functions, Is governed by more general and wider networks of power, and this different relationship between kings and the power structure often results in a great difference in decision-making mechanisms and in their preferred ways of countering popular discontent if it occurs, and this difference is evident in the way it responded Including Morocco, to the February 20 protests accompanying the Arab Spring, where the king chose to introduce constitutional reforms that entrenched the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary and granted wider powers to the elected government as well as to civil society and human rights councils. He also released political prisoners, Popular in any form of repression or violence, which is not customary for Arab countries in general.

This particular Moroccan behavior was what Saudi Arabia wanted to avoid in the first place, because any democratic and constitutional transition - albeit limited - to Arab ownership would stimulate a series of transitional processes in other monarchies similar to those of the Arab Spring. Morocco is afraid to find itself stuck in a Saudi ideological war not only against Shiite Islam, but to control the public debate within the Sunni Arab world and try to formulate it to suit Riyadh's anti-liberal and democratic tendencies effectively, meaning that Morocco will be required of him - before joining the Gulf Club - The Has worked with the Islamic movements in the same way that the Gulf countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia dealt with them in the wake of the Arab Spring through ban and restriction, while these movements have historical roots and remain part of the public domain recognized in Morocco, despite some political quarrels between them and minors, At no point did he reach a dispute with the Moroccan monarch or have the desire to undermine the existing balances within the political system.

Periods of convergence

For all these reasons, and due to disagreement over the matter among the GCC countries, the general debate on the expansion of the GCC and its transformation into a club for Arab property was not quickly diluted. Instead, Jordan and Morocco were proposed to join a comprehensive military alliance comprising the Gulf states. The second Gulf crisis was triggered by the fallout of the first Gulf crisis and the withdrawal of their ambassadors from Doha by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, but this did not prevent the Gulf kingdoms from throwing their financial weight to support Mohammed VI through a $ 5 billion aid package to help the government. To overcome the deficit of the balancer Increasing civil service salaries and energy subsidies, similar to what the Gulf ruling families have done on a large scale to buy support from their citizens.

Since then, 10 GCC investments have developed in Morocco, particularly in the sectors of tourism, real estate, green energy and financial industries.For example, Riyadh became the fifth largest foreign direct investor in Morocco in 2017, accounting for 6.1% of the country's total investment. The UAE ranked third with 10.3%. The Saudi government invested in the $ 2 billion high-speed rail project, Travel time between Casablanca and Tangier is halved, while the Saudi-Moroccan Business Council is actively campaigning for the development of a direct maritime shipping corridor between Morocco and Saudi Arabia.

In the field of energy, the increasing influence of Saudi capital in Morocco is also evident not only in the oil energy sector, but in the renewable energy sector in the African country, due to the Moroccan goal of increasing the contribution of renewable energy in the energy mix there to 42% by 2020 The Moroccan Solar Agency is working with the Saudi Aqua Power Group to develop photovoltaic facilities in Ouarzazate, Laayoune and Boujdour. Aqua Power also cooperated with Arkan Infrastructure Fund, To develop the Khalidi wind station in Tangier.

Tourism is another area of ​​trade cooperation between Morocco and Saudi Arabia, especially with the sector contributing about 8.1% of Morocco's GDP and the vision to transform Morocco into one of the top 20 destinations in the world by 2020. In this regard, Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz chose to spend his annual vacation in 2017 at his palace in Tangier, a holiday in which King spent about $ 100 million, equivalent to 1.3% of Morocco's total tourism revenue. $ 1 billion a year on foreign tourism - according to data for 2016 and 2017 - that leaves a lot of potential revenue for Morocco.

Gradually, the growing economic partnership between Rabat and Riyadh turned into a form of mutual political support. While Saudi Arabia stressed its support for Morocco in the Sahara issue, especially after the Rabat declaration in 2014 that Iran was providing military support to Polisario fighters, Rabat participated in the Saudi military alliance In Yemen in 2015, and supported the Saudi military efforts by sending 1500 soldiers and six fighter planes to participate in the war, and did not stop at that limit, where Morocco cooperated with Saudi Arabia in its efforts to hunt down political dissidents, and the most prominent incident in this regard is the Framework arrested and jailed Saudi prince «rebel» "Turki bin Bandar" before you handed over to Riyadh in 2015 as well.

Time of Gefira

The period between 2011 and 2017 was a long honeymoon between Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Although Rabat has always refused to recognize Saudi Arabia as a more dominant brother and fought to maintain an independent policy, this has not prevented the relations slowly developing on the basis of common economic interests Rabat need funds Saudi Arabia to support the faltering budget, and the need for Riyadh to take advantage of the relative technical progress of the Moroccans and its geographical position as a gateway head of the African continent, as well as on the basis of 11 common hostility against Iran, especially after Rabat has decided to resume its campaign against the recent cross - cutting diplomatic relations again Early May of last year 2018.

Moroccan-Iranian tensions were renewed in March 2017, when Moroccan authorities arrested Lebanese businessman belonging to the Lebanese Hezbollah, Kassem Tag Eddin, in Casablanca during his return to Beirut from Guinea-Bissau, for the Kingdom to extradite him to trial in the states The United Nations, where Morocco believes that Taj Eddin was the official in charge of Hezbollah to communicate with the Frente POLISARIO, and that he may have worked in coordination with the Iranian cultural attaché in Algeria, "Amir Moussawi," a former Iranian intelligence officer and former Deputy Minister of Defense believes Morocco He smuggled sophisticated weapons to "Hezbollah", including SAM 9 and 11 missiles, Russian and Russian-made Strela missiles.

For Saudi Arabia, the escalation of Morocco against Tehran was an invaluable opportunity to strengthen its relations with the Atlantic Kingdom, had it not been amidst a tumultuous tension between the two kingdoms due to the crisis of the siege of Qatar in mid-2017 and the pressure exerted by Riyadh led by "Ibn Salman" Which appeared to have angered Rabat, which it fiercely opposed to its traditional policy of neutrality 12 towards Middle East crises. Instead of responding to Saudi pressure, Rabat sent planes laden with tons of food to Doha, while " Mohammed VI "is the first regional leader to visit Doha aftermath of the siege.

Morocco's behavior was not biased to Doha - although interpreted in Riyadh as such - as it was a form of rebellion against Riyadh's attempts to extend its political hegemony over its allies, a behavior that Riyadh never seemed to forgive Morocco. Salman has decided to spend his annual holiday in 2018 in the coastal city of Naum, rather than in Morocco. Saudi Arabia has not only made this quiet message, but sought to punish Rabat with supporting the joint US file for organizing the 2026 World Cup at the expense of Morocco. Moreover, it has put pressure on the UAE To Kuwait and Bahrain to vote against Morocco, an act of Moroccans looked at him as a «serious affront» seems to pay them for a quiet review of the nature of their relationship with Saudi Arabia, the kingdom, which shows that they no longer accept its allies less than full compliance with its policies.

The report, broadcast by Saudi Arabia and the Frente POLISARIO, was the straw that broke the camel's back for Rabat. Morocco responded by announcing its withdrawal from the Yemen war and inviting its ambassador in Riyadh to return to the country. Has shown a clear diplomatic gesture to her anger; when she refused to host Ibn Salman in Rabat during his North African tour late last year and announced diplomatic reasons in the form of problems in scheduling the visit and citing the "lack of readiness," in what many considered as a deliberate rebuke by the Moroccan monarch If The Saudi crown.

Morocco's messages of indignation were evident, although Morocco chose to show it more publicly in a quieter fashion when he claimed that the return of the Moroccan ambassador to his country was a routine procedure for participating in meetings on the Middle East and Moroccan politics and that no official position was taken to withdraw the ambassador, He stressed that his country's relationship with Riyadh is fine, a trend that is also in line with Morocco's non-aligned policy and reflects Morocco's desire to maintain its Gulf relations while preserving the independence of its political positions and its own priorities, which gradually move away from the clash with the issues of the Middle East. St in favor of playing a leading role (13) in the surroundings of Africa, a trend that has become firmly since the restoration of Morocco for its position in the African Union in 2017.

Despite the preference of Morocco and Riyadh to keep their political tension as muffled and disciplined as possible, the two countries recognize that there are a number of issues of major disagreement between them that will not disappear overnight, and in light of Saudi frustration with the policy of Moroccan neutrality in the Gulf crisis and Morocco's refusal to comply in general trends Riyadh political, and in light of the anger of Rabat attempts Saudi Arabia use of forced compliance policy through the threat of implicitly to change its position in the Sahara issue, it is likely that the Saudi - Moroccan relations will remain 14 tense in the short term in light of holding each position, but the two countries will be keen These tensions will probably not come out of control, while economic benefits will continue to lead the locomotive of relations in the midst of political tension, waiting for an opportunity to overcome differences and restore warm relations without any party having to make concessions, an opportunity that will not come soon. It seems that under current Saudi political behavior, there is a lack of strategy and a lack of planning. The great truth remains that whatever the current tensions will ultimately end up, the Atlantic coast has clearly revealed that it will never become a place for Saudi influence. Mounting e Ment Gulf forces -ovi particularly Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates - policy, Morocco is likely to remain one of the most obvious outside the domination of exceptions.