The Pentagon announced the start of negotiations on changing the format of the presence of troops in Iraq from a “coalition presence” (although there has been no coalition there for a long time) to “bilateral interaction.” Behind these formulations lies an already clearly made decision to curtail the presence of American troops in the country. Earlier, rumors spread (later refuted) about the possibility of withdrawing American troops from northern Syria. There is no doubt that in the near future there will be maneuvers around the al-Tanf zone, captured by the United States in southern Syria and turned into a training center for radical Islamists of all stripes.
The situation no longer looks like an attempt by the Pentagon to withdraw troops from attacks by pro-Iranian proxies, but as part of a more significant process, which, however, cannot yet be called a plan. Clear traces of haste are visible, which, on the one hand, are the result of the realization that American troops have turned from an asset into a target, and on the other hand, representing the traditional US tactics of “getting lost” when curtailing a failed geopolitical project.
No one doubts that the US Middle East project has failed. Planned at the end of the 20th century as the cornerstone of a unipolar world, it ends - after wars, the Arab Spring, destroyed countries and ruined lives - with the prospect of a war between the United States and Israel against Iran and its allies. And this is not to mention the undermined reputation of the United States as a world hegemon, even among its most loyal allies. And the main thing (and the significance of this circumstance has yet to be realized) is that the United States has clearly established a reputation as a force capable of only destroying, no matter what - cities, states, the lives of peoples - but not capable of creating anything. A force that represents war and chaos, but not peace and development.
In a world where the United States had no competitors, such reputational losses were unpleasant but tolerable. Now this is a real geopolitical factor.
In recent years, it has been obvious that the United States has no serious ideas for the Middle East. The region was seen as a transit point in the US strategic project to gain a foothold in the Indo-Pacific region and isolate China. To leave behind a degrading Europe and the burning Middle East, at the same time putting “traffic jams” on the route of the Great Silk Road trade route, implemented by China, and the North-South industrial and logistics corridor, implemented by Russia, Iran, and the countries of the Persian Gulf. The main actions of the United States in the last year and a half - from financing the Kyiv regime to attempts to spoil relations between Riyadh and Beijing - were built around this task. That is why the successes of the PRC - diplomatic, political, and military in the Near and Middle East - caused a nervous reaction.
The US’s own policy after the “Abraham Accords” pushed through by Donald Trump (we are talking about mediation in the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan) came down to the simple formula of “rocking the carriage and announcing stops,” which was clearly manifested in the statements of the US Presidential Adviser on national security of Jake Sullivan on the eve of the bloody conflict in Gaza. The substantive emptiness of American policy was well understood in the Middle Eastern capitals, which was very evident from the behavior of Riyadh. And there is no doubt that Trump will be happy to play the theme “Who lost the Middle East?”
The problem with the current American maneuver in the Middle East is not only that, given the current political conditions within the United States, it can easily turn into a formal flight with serious political consequences worse than Afghanistan and the loss of a significant part of the weapons and military equipment stored in the region. It will be extremely difficult to go back, because even a controlled “exodus” of the United States will jeopardize the few remaining pro-American regimes, in particular Jordan. Not to mention the fact that it will completely undermine trust in the United States as a long-term partner. Taking into account the peculiarities of the Near and Middle East, they will begin to interact with Americans “on an advance payment basis.”
The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editors.