"Trapped" Ethiopia and maritime dominance. Motives and outcomes

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on one of the battlefronts (social media)

"How can a country with a population of about 150 million live in a 'geography prison"!

"Ethiopia's presence is linked to the Red Sea," the issue of discussing the Red Sea should not be a taboo for Ethiopians."

This is how Abiy Ahmed spoke in his famous and dangerous speech to parliament last October, and although in the same speech he specified the way to access the sea by: "Eritrea, Somalia or Djibouti", he surprised everyone earlier this year by ignoring the governments of these three countries, and going to sign a memorandum of understanding with the Republic of Somaliland, which is not officially recognized until now, according to which he obtained an area of 20 kilometers in the vicinity of the port of Berbera for 50 years, in exchange for recognizing the Republic of Somaliland, and get a share of Ethiopian Airlines!

This trend raises questions about the novelty of this agreement from its predecessor, which was also signed with Somaliland and the UAE company DP World in March 2018 "shortly after he took office", under which Addis Ababa obtained a 19% stake in the port of Berbera, compared to 51% for Dubai, and 30% for Somaliland, in addition to the development of the land road linking Ethiopian territory and the port with a length of 260 kilometers. The agreement was cancelled by the Somaliland government with Addis Ababa in June 2022 due to the latter's lack of commitment to developing this road.

It also raises another question – no less important than its timing – as it comes just two days after the Djibouti-sponsored agreement between Somalia and Somaliland, which stipulated the resumption of political negotiations between the two parties with a focus on the crucial issues: "separation or unity", which means torpedoing Djibouti's efforts and torpedoing the idea of negotiations.

It is true that Somaliland announced last September that it would not compromise with Somalia on the issue of secession and independence, but would discuss ways to achieve this, but this preemption also contributed to a divergence with the central government in Mogadishu, which signed an agreement with Abiy Ahmed in June 2018 that includes his country's investment in four Somali seaports to attract foreign investment.

It also does not mind concluding such a deal with Addis Ababa, as it affirms Somali sovereignty over the region, especially in light of the close relations between the two sides, which were recently embodied in the renewal of the military agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia last October.

For Djibouti and Eritrea, their initial position was to reject the agreement, considering it a potential threat to their sovereignty, as well as its economic impact on the revenues of Ethiopian trade that was passing through these ports.

Ethiopia's motives towards the Red Sea

It is clear that the recent agreement with Somaliland, despite the lack of information about it, differs from the 2018 agreement in that it is a sovereign agreement, giving Addis Ababa freedom of movement in this region, as well as the possibility of establishing a naval military base in that area, which is not far from Bab al-Mandeb, the "southern entrance" to the Red Sea, and perhaps this explains why it stipulates in return the possibility of Ethiopia recognizing this non-internationally recognized state. Abiy Ahmed seems to have played on this point, taking advantage of the pursuit of Musa Bihi Abdi, the outgoing president of Somalia last November, to achieve any economic or political achievement that contributes to his victory in the upcoming elections.

Internal and external motives for Ethiopia's orientation towards the Red Sea

• First, Abiy Ahmed's desire to achieve his imperial ambitions, which go beyond his country's trapped borders and seek to dominate the region as a whole. The man did not deny this imperial dream in a 2018 speech, stating that his mother told him at the age of 7 that he would be the seventh emperor divinely destined to unite and rule Ethiopia, representing the number 7, from Genesis to Revelation, perfection.

Thus, he seeks to repeat the imperial dream of Haile Selassie, who sought in the forties of the last century to annex Eritrea by force to reach the Red Sea, and he also wants to block the way for the Amhara elites who adopt the same proposal, especially in light of the state of hostility and war between him and the Amhara nationalism led by the Fano Front, "one of its allies yesterday in the face of the Tigrayan."

He probably won't pursue this dream by force as Haile Selassie did, but he doesn't mind using it when necessary. This was confirmed in a speech last October, where he noted that Ethiopia has "natural rights" to direct access to the Red Sea, and if it is deprived of these "rights", "there will be no fairness and justice, and if there is no fairness and justice. It's a matter of time, we'll fight."

• Second: the desire to control the five main ports in his project based on the unification of the Horn of Africa as an economic bloc in which the navy plays a prominent role. Perhaps this explains why he was interested two years ago in reviving the navy through an agreement with France, after this weapon was dissolved in 1996, three years after Eritrea's independence, and turned his country into a landlocked state.

This may explain why he focused – in the first months of his tenure – on concluding economic agreements related to ports with the countries of the Horn of Africa in the broad sense, which included an agreement with Somalia on 4 coastal ports on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, an agreement with Eritrea on the development of a road between the two countries that facilitates the passage of goods to the port of Assab on the Red Sea, a third agreement with Djibouti on the purchase of a share of the port of Djibouti, from which 95% of Ethiopia's exports and imports enter, and a fourth agreement. with Sudan on the exploitation of part of the port of Port Sudan on the Red Sea for export, and a fifth agreement with Kenya on land on the island of Lamu on the Indian Ocean.

• Third: Reducing the fees for using the port of Djibouti, which costs the country about two billion dollars annually, in addition to the great international competition witnessed by Djibouti, which has become a destination for global countries: "the United States, France, China", and therefore the man fears that this competition will affect his country's foreign trade.

Another point related to the port of Djibouti is the possibility of cutting off the road leading to it by taking control of the Afar region, which the Tigray Front threatened in the last war, which means a complete paralysis of the country's foreign trade.

• Fourth: The desire to increase foreign investments and improve economic conditions in general after the decline in the economic growth rate from 9% in 2019 to about 5% last year. This decline has been greatly affected by the Corona crisis and the Tigray war.
• Fifth: Strained relations with Eritrea due to its rejection of the Pretoria Agreement signed by Ethiopia with the Tigray Front in November 2022, to stop the war, as well as the rumors of Asmara supporting the Amharic Fano Front in its recent war against the regime, in addition to the beginning of rapprochement "again" between Eritrea and the Egyptian regime.
• Sixth: Winning the favor of the international community after the criticism directed at it because of the Tigray war, as well as winning the favor of Washington, which wants to dismantle the Eritrean-Ethiopian alliance, after Asmara headed towards Moscow and Beijing, and threatened to grant Russia a base on the Red Sea.
• Seventh: The desire to impose his country's accession to the Red Sea Forum, which was formed in 2020, and includes 8 countries: (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia), after rejecting a previous request. Therefore, Abiy Ahmed announced in February 2022 that the security of the Red Sea cannot be achieved without the participation of Ethiopia, which will preserve its strategic interests in remote areas over the next fifteen years.

He may also seek to find a foothold for his country in the coalition currently formed by the United States to counter Houthi attacks in Bab al-Mandab, thus currying favor with Washington and Tel Aviv together.

Outcome of the agreement

The first reaction to the agreement came "practically" from Somalia, which considered it canceled, and affects its sovereignty, but did not specify what the next step will be, will it raise the matter to the African Union, whose charter rejects infringement of the national sovereignty of member states?, or will it raise the matter to the United Nations?, nor did it decide whether to proceed with the implementation of the 2018 agreement on the four ports with Addis Ababa, or cancel it?

It is clear that the Mogadishu government will not go far from this, and perhaps these escalatory steps aim to reach a new agreement with it that benefits it on the one hand, and confirms the dependence of Somaliland on the other hand, which is the same position it took during the Dubai Ports agreement with Somaliland 2018, where it wanted the agreement to be signed with it.

In fact, the Somali reaction is governed by several considerations, most notably the difficulty of threatening to launch a war against Ethiopia, in light of Mogadishu's preoccupation with confronting Al-Shabaab, and Mogadishu even depends on Addis Ababa in this confrontation through the latter's participation in the African forces operating there "Atmeis".

As for Djibouti and Eritrea, their initial position was to reject the agreement, considering it a potential threat to their sovereignty, as well as its economic impact on the revenues of Ethiopian trade that was passing through these ports. Asmara may fear that the latest agreement is an attempt to revive Emperor Haile Selassie's idea of controlling Assab, which Djibouti sees in return as an overthrow of its diplomatic efforts on Somali reconciliation.

This latest agreement may lead to the possibility of the three countries: Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti, to agree to form an alliance against Ethiopia, and to become a new bloc, which may receive support from both the United States in the case of Somalia and Djibouti, or Russia in the case of Eritrea.

However, this planned alliance depends on several factors, most notably Ethiopia's reassurances to these countries on the one hand, and the extent of support these countries can receive from Washington and Moscow on the other. There is no doubt that if this alliance takes place, Addis Ababa will witness a shift from the "zero problems" policy adopted by Abiy Ahmed upon coming to power, to the policy of "uniting opponents" in one alliance, due to the imperial dream and the desire to dominate the region.