Gulf 2020 .. Burning fires and turbulent water

Tehran and Washington ... the escalation race
The Gulf crisis and the decline of optimism
Mandate era and succession of a generation

The Arab Gulf almost deposited in 2019 with an optimistic tone about a new year and decade. In the last quarter of the year, the American / Iranian escalation had fallen to its lowest levels, and talk began about Saudi / Qatari negotiations to resolve the Gulf crisis, and Kuwait and Riyadh reached a new agreement on the regions The joint ends the conflict that has been going on for more than two years.

However, this optimistic tone did not last for long: the escalation between Washington and Tehran came, and then the media exchange returned to the most intense among the parties to the Gulf crisis, and new challenges entered the line; all this was between the last week of 2019 and the first week of 2020.
The Arab Gulf region - which was previously seen as an oasis of stability in an ocean of chaos - is rapidly approaching its surroundings, and is even transcending it to become the expected focus of conflict that observers are highlighting this year.

Tehran and Washington ... the escalation race
After the escalation of escalation between Washington and Tehran in 2019, the world breathed a sigh of relief after threatening the attack on tankers in the Gulf waters - something that the region has not seen since the end of the Iran-Iraq war - and targeting Aramco by igniting a third Gulf war, neither party on either side of the Gulf nor Beyond that.

But the Iranians apparently had another opinion. In the face of harsh sanctions on the Iranian economy and the internal challenges it has brought about, the Iranian regime has chosen a policy of controlled escalation for a period, meaning that Tehran resorts - through its proxies - to deliberate provocations that are difficult to attribute directly to Tehran, but it confuses the US administration and weakens the American President Donald Trump's internal position, It puts pressure on Washington's allies in the region to push for a solution that guarantees sanctions are lifted, if only partially, or reduced.

The bet here was that Trump did not want a real confrontation in an election year, and he could be pushed towards easing the sanctions if the right stick was available by constant pressure, and the carrot offered to negotiate; but the events of the last days of 2019 and the first week of 2020 proved that this bet was not working.

On December 27, 2019, a missile attack on the K1 base - in the Iraqi city of Kirkuk - killed an American contractor, as the first American dead in the context of the escalation between Trump and Tehran. And since the killing of American citizens was the red line for the American administration, the response came quickly by targeting the headquarters and control of the Iraqi Hizballah battalions in Iraq and Syria, so that the outcome would be more than 25 dead and wounded pride for the pro-Iranian factions in Iraq, led by the popular crowd.

It seems that the Iranian regime believed that the end of the scene would be with those mass demonstrations around the American embassy in Baghdad, and photographed the crowd cadres smashing the windows of one of the embassy gates; but this moral work in its bulk was highly sensitive to the American president, because the attack on the embassy in this way is linked in the mindset The Americans generally committed the events of 1979, when supporters of the Islamic Revolution in Iran stormed the American embassy in Tehran, and kidnapped 52 American hostages for a period of more than 14 months.

But for Trump, the most important link was with the attack on two US facilities in Benghazi in 2012, when members of an al Qaeda-linked group - calling itself "Ansar al-Sharia" - attacked a diplomatic headquarters that served as a US embassy there, and a site for the CIA ( CIA), and the attack resulted in the killing of American Ambassador Jay Christopher Stevens and three of his countrymen.

This incident was exploited a lot by Trump in his attack on his Democratic predecessor Barack Obama, and then on his Democratic rival in the presidential elections (in 2016) Hillary Clinton, who was Secretary of State at the time of the attack in Benghazi.

Consequently, the attack on the American embassy in Baghdad posed a serious threat to Trump's narrative, which has always said that Benghazi was a catastrophic failure in leadership. Therefore, Trump chose to assassinate Qassem Soleimani - who is the commander of the Qods Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the most prominent figure in Iran's military activity outside its borders - to be the message he provides to home and abroad, according to which he will not hesitate in responding to the conflict, seeking everyone who targets his country and its international presence.

The world today stands in a state of anticipation - especially in the Gulf region - for the future of the confrontation between Washington and Tehran; but what is beyond doubt is that Iran cannot reduce the level of escalation in a way that does not guarantee American casualties, as it is - in the face of its moral and military defeat by assassinating its most prominent military leaders - It needs to demonstrate its ability to respond and the cohesion of its military entity. Otherwise, its status will become similar to that of Saddam Hussein's regime under US sanctions.

And as an American, the Trump administration is looking for a way out of the crisis that would make the last slap less severe by talking with prospective mediators with Tehran, and sending various messages to the Iranian regime, some of which have been heavy-handed, such as the threat of the American president to target 52 Iranian sites, some of which are cultural in nature, while others appear to be a push towards calming the invitation Until the response is "appropriate."

The position of the Gulf states on this wave of escalation appears to be more homogeneous than before. In the previous wave, there was a Qatari / Kuwaiti / Oman calming axis, and a Saudi / Emirati escalation axis. But after Trump's let down of his allies, the axis of escalation turned into a quick calm with Iran, especially after targeting Aramco.

As for this wave, all the Gulf states called for calm and restraint, and the US Secretary of State specifically thanked him - in principle - for Abu Dhabi and Riyadh for their understanding of the danger of Iran in the region, but he returned to thank Qatar for its efforts to calm, especially after the visit of the Deputy Prime Minister Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani to Tehran.

In calculating the priorities, there is no doubt that the Gulf states - particularly Saudi Arabia and the Emirates - fall within the scope of the expected goals of the Iranian response, in addition to the American presence in Iraq and Israel, and Washington's failure to respond to the attacks on Saudi Arabia represents a major challenge for them, and it may even make the goals Saudi Arabia is an "acceptable" response in the American context.

At the same time, this escalation is an opportunity for Doha to prove its success in playing the role that it was mastering in the region, and it has retracted it in recent years. It is the mediating role between the United States and some of its opponents, whether they are states or non-state actors. In light of the Sultan’s illness in Oman, and Kuwaiti domestic political challenges, Qatar appears to be the closest Gulf player to this role.

The Gulf crisis and the decline of optimism
The statements made by the Qatari and Saudi foreign ministers on various occasions regarding the existence of direct negotiations between the two parties to end the crisis were a glimmer of hope held by the Gulf peoples in the hope of folding the darkest pages in the history of the region, and it seemed that the meetings did not revolve around what preceded but rather what could Its achievement and the shape of the relationship that can be drawn between the two parties.

As a result, it appears that a decision was taken to reduce the severity of the media statements - whether from the officials of the two countries or through the official media - targeting the other party, and the organization of the Gulf Cup in Qatar and the acceptance of the blockade countries - at the last minute - participation in it was an official popular opportunity to optimize the future Best for Gulf relations.

This optimism quickly retreated with the softening of statements regarding reconciliation between the two parties, and the return of the language of escalation, at least at the level of the official media, especially in the context of the Saudi reaction to the Kuala Lumpur summit in which His Highness the Emir of Qatar participated next to the Turkish and Iranian presidents and the Malaysian Prime Minister. The Saudi newspapers have returned to accuse Qatar of splitting the ranks, and alliance with Iran, Malaysia and Turkey to weaken the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which is under the Saudi sphere of influence.

Hence, a return to the main headlines and critical articles for Qatar was noted, even in the context of the Saudi popular campaign against goods received from Jebel Ali in the Emirates, in which arrows of criticism were directed to Qatar by some influencers and essayists affiliated with various departments of the Saudi authority, despite the absence of any A clear or even perceived link to Qatar with this campaign or its causes.

The escalation of the dispute in Libya between the Gulf parties in support of retired Major General Khalifa Hifter, led by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia; and Qatar in support of the reconciliation government, was a lever for the renewal of the Gulf dispute, especially after the approval of the Turkish Parliament to send troops to Libya.

However, despite these negative developments, no statement has been issued by either side stating that the Saudi / Qatari negotiations have stopped. Most likely, Riyadh is concerned with reconciliation but is not prepared to make real concessions to Qatar, especially in light of the escalation taking place in the region in general.

On the Qatar side, there does not seem to be any sense of urgency to end the crisis, especially if this means a political concession in favor of Riyadh, just as the greater reliance is on negotiating with Saudi Arabia far from the rest of the parties, and the penetration of the UAE / Saudi alliance could achieve this.

Mandate era and succession of a generation
The file of the mandate of the covenant - at least in four Gulf capitals - is of great importance, in light of the progress of the rulers of these countries in their age and their health condition faltering, as the region is awaiting the handing over of the last group of rulers who have experienced the emergence of the state in the Gulf and the path of cooperation in it the flag for a generation that grew up in the boom and was As a result of its circumstances.

In Oman and Kuwait in particular, some uncertainty surrounds the political future due to the lack of clarity in the chain of mandate for the Covenant. In Oman where there is no crown prince, many observers expect that Asaad bin Tariq bin Taimur - who is the personal representative of His Majesty the Sultan and Deputy Prime Minister - is the favorite, given his closeness to the Sultan and his military background, and his standing at the level of members of the ruling family and the Omanis in the form of Year.

However, reports spoke of his son Taymur, the Secretary-General of the Council for Scientific Research as another option, especially that the happiest cousin of Sultan Qaboos directly, and his brothers have all exceeded sixty years. But in general, and given the political nature of Oman and its royal court, there is no significant change expected in the level of foreign policy, and it is expected that Oman will remain under the banner of negative neutrality towards the issues of the region.

As for Kuwait, in which talk was being made about the rehabilitation of Sheikh Nasser Al-Sabah, the son of His Highness, the Emir of Kuwait, as an option that follows Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad, who is the crown prince and brother of the prince; Consequently, the door remains wide open for a new option, especially since the Crown Prince - who enjoys a medical reputation and wide acceptance in Kuwait - suffers from illness and age, which makes choosing the Crown Prince essential to maintaining political stability in Kuwait.

With the increasing reports that talk about differences between family members, the need to resolve these options increases, especially that His Highness Prince Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad suffers from health fluctuations that required his hospitalization several times in recent months. Although it is difficult to speculate on the personalities that could be chosen under the current circumstances in Kuwait, it is not excluded that the question of the mandate of the Covenant will be transformed from a hypothetical question to a realistic one during this year.

In the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the picture is different because the actual rulers of these two countries are the rulers of the covenant. In the case of the Emirates, Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed has practiced power for more than a decade, almost since his father’s death. Although the UAE constitution states that the head of state is elected from the Supreme Council that includes the rulers of the Emirates, it is inconceivable that the option will depart from Mohammed bin Zayed, the strongman, who ended any opportunity for the emergence of opponents, competitors, or even a secondary power position in the state.

In Saudi Arabia, there is a lot of talk about the state of health and mental ability of King Salman, there is no doubt that Muhammad bin Salman is the front of the system and the most prominent decision-maker in it, but his declining international presence - the result of repeated failures and the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi - raised questions about the possibility of losing his opportunity to sit on the throne If his father dies.

But if we take into account the deliberate weakening of the poles of the family, and the absence of institutions in Saudi Arabia from the scene, it is difficult to imagine a political change that will remove Bin Salman from power, and if he arrives at it officially, he may find himself in need to reproduce a local and regional consensus that guarantees his stability in power.

The Arab Gulf receives a new contract, and the illusion of stability around it has dissipated, and the differences within and outside it have been floated on its surface; the major questions regarding the state, development, social structure and political relations still exist without real answers, and the Gulf states still - despite their political presence in the regional and international scene - It is the recipient of regional transformations that do not make them. Is the year 2020 a positive or negative milestone in the history of this small and influential part of the world? Or will it be - as it was a few years earlier - a continuation of a situation in which stability appeared and within it were the seeds of major crises?